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Summary
An estimated 11 million unauthorized aliens reside in the United States, and this
population is estimated to increase by 500,000 annually.  Each year, approximately
1 million aliens are apprehended trying to enter the United States illegally.  Although
most of these aliens enter the United States for economic opportunities and family
reunification, or to avoid civil strife and political unrest, some are criminals, and
some may be terrorists.  All are violating the United States’ immigration laws.
Immigration enforcement is the regulation of those who violate provisions of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  This includes violations of the INA’s
civil provisions  (e.g., violate the conditions of their admittance), as well as U.S.
citizens or aliens who violate the criminal provisions (e.g., marriage fraud or alien
smuggling).  Many divergent tasks are incorporated under the banner of immigration
enforcement.  These include removing aliens who should not be in the United States,
investigating alien smuggling and trafficking, patrolling between and at ports of
entry, combating document and benefit fraud, and enforcing the prohibitions against
employers hiring aliens without work authorization.
Historically, more resources (measured in staff hours) have been allotted to
enforcement at the border than enforcement within the United States.  While the
amount of U.S. Border Patrol (USBP)  resources almost doubled between FY1997
and FY2003, time spent on other enforcement activities increased only slightly, while
the number of inspection hours decreased.  Furthermore, focusing on “interior”
enforcement, in FY2003, the largest amount of  staff time was devoted to locating
and arresting criminal aliens (39%), followed by administrative and non-investigative
duties (23%) and alien smuggling investigations (15%).  Only 4% was devoted to
worksite enforcement (i.e., locating and arresting aliens working without
authorization, and punishing employers who hire such workers).
The 109th Congress has spent much time debating immigration enforcement and
the unauthorized alien population. Congress could allocate more resources to
immigration enforcement activities, raising the question of what is the most efficient
allocation of resources among the different enforcement tasks.  For example, some
assert that the United States has not truly tried immigration enforcement, arguing that
most of the resources have been devoted to border enforcement, instead of fully
engaging in other types of immigration enforcement; others contend that only a
legalization program can reduce the unauthorized population.  In addition, Congress
could expand the immigration enforcement role of other federal agencies and state
and local law enforcement. Many fear, however, that this option will distract the
agencies and local law enforcement from their primary missions.  Since many of the
unauthorized aliens come to the United States for economic opportunities, some
argue that a guest worker program, creating opportunities for a large number of aliens
to come to the United States to work, could significantly reduce unauthorized
migration.  Others argue that an increase in the enforcement of the prohibition against
hiring illegal alien workers and the use and manufacturing of fraudulent documents
would make it more difficult for unauthorized aliens to find work, resulting in a
decrease in the unauthorized population.  This report will not be updated.
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Immigration Enforcement Within the 
United States
Introduction
It is estimated that there are more than 11 million unauthorized aliens1 currently
living in the United States, and the resident unauthorized alien population is
estimated to increase by 500,000 people per year.2  In addition, each year
approximately 1 million aliens are apprehended while trying to illegally enter the
United States.  Although most of these aliens are entering the United States for
economic opportunities or fleeing civil strife and political unrest, some are criminals,
and some may be terrorists.3  All are violating the immigration laws of the United
States.
The existence of a large unauthorized population creates an illicit industry
devoted to creating fraudulent identities and documents to aid unauthorized aliens in
living and working in the United States.  Illegal identity documents may be used by
terrorists and other criminals who desire to remain hidden from law enforcement.4
In addition, some argue that it would be harder for unauthorized aliens, including
criminals and terrorists, to stay in the United States if finding a job were more
difficult.5  The Center for Immigration Studies found that eight of the 48  al Qaeda
foreign born terrorists operating in the United States since 1993 worked in the United
States illegally.6
CRS-2
7
 Belinda I. Reyes, Hans P. Johnson, and Richard Van Swearingen,  Holding the Line? The
Effect of Recent Border Build-up on Unauthorized Immigration, Public Policy Institute of
California, July 2002, p. 80.  (Hereafter cited as Reyes, Holding the Line? The Effect of
Recent Border Build-up on Unauthorized Immigration.)
8
 Importantly, the discussions of certain enforcement activities (e.g., worksite enforcement
and alien smuggling) are more detailed than those for other activities since CRS does not
have individual reports on these subjects.
Some have argued that the U.S. government has been unsuccessful in
controlling illegal immigration due to a conflict in political will; the desire to prevent
the illegal entry of those who might seek to harm the United States and its populace
(e.g., terrorists, criminals), and the need to provide workers for labor-intensive
industries (e.g., agriculture, food processing, restaurants).  There is evidence of this
conflict as far back as the mid-1800s with the arrival of Irish immigrants.7
Policy Issues
The large unauthorized alien population raises concerns since  it is very difficult
to know if any unauthorized aliens are terrorists or criminals.  In addition, the
existence of a underground population leads to the propagation of an illegal
document industry.  Nonetheless, the majority of unauthorized aliens work in the
United States, raising concerns that their removal will harm the U.S. economy and
illustrating a desire or need of some employers for this pool of labor.  What are the
best methods to decrease the unauthorized population without disrupting sectors of
the economy that depend on foreign labor? Should the United States increase its
efforts to reduce the unauthorized alien population, and what are the best methods
and use of resources to achieve this goal? Are the current laws adequate?  Should
other federal agencies or local law enforcement agencies become more involved in
immigration enforcement?  Is the Department of Homeland Security conducting
immigration enforcement in an efficient manner?
Report Overview
This report provides an analysis of immigration enforcement within the United
States.  The report opens with a definition of immigration enforcement, a discussion
of the statutory authority to conduct immigration enforcement, and an overview of
immigration enforcement related legislation since 1986.  It follows with an
exposition on the dichotomy of interior and border enforcement.  The report then
details different aspects of immigration enforcement in the United States including
detention and removal, alien smuggling and trafficking, document and benefit fraud,
worksite enforcement, inspections at ports of entry, and patrolling the border between
ports of entry.8  The report continues with a discussion of the role of state and local
law enforcement in the enforcement of immigration laws.  The report then presents
a comparative analysis of the resources devoted to divergent immigration
enforcement activities.  It concludes with a discussion of crosscutting immigration
enforcement issues related to the structure of the Department of Homeland Security.
A list of acronyms is provided in the appendix.
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 For example, this includes an alien who overstays his visa or an alien who is working when
his visa prohibits employment.
Data and Analysis.  The report uses different workload measures for the
distinct immigration enforcement activities, and these measures are presented for the
most current years that the data are available.  For example, for the removal of aliens,
the workload measure used is the number of removals, while the workload for
worksite enforcement in measured in the issuance of Notices of Intent to Fine
(NIF’s).  Nonetheless, none of these measures are comparable with each other.  For
example,  comparing the number of NIF’s issued with the number of removals does
not provide any insight into the disparate resource allocation for these two tasks.  In
addition, due to the changes in immigration enforcement priorities after the attacks
of September 11, 2001, wherever possible, measures of enforcement activities are
presented prior to and after FY2001.
To compare the resources devoted to different enforcement activities, the report
analyzes data on agent work hours for each enforcement activity.  The data are from
the Department of Homeland Security’s Performance Analysis System (PAS).  The
hours are presented as workyears, as 2,080 hours equal one workyear. Due to data
limitations, the analysis of the hours is limited to FY1992 through FY2003.  During
2004, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) switched their accounting system from PAS to the U.S. Customs
Service’s Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS), and as a result,
data for 2004 onward are not comparable with previous years.  TECS contains fewer
data fields than PAS, which means that some of the measures in PAS do not exist in
TECS.  In addition, the data for FY2004 are incomplete in both systems, as the
different components in DHS did not switch from PAS to TECS at the same time.
What is Immigration Enforcement?
Immigration enforcement is the regulation of those who violate provisions of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  This includes violations of the civil
provisions of the INA (e.g., aliens who enter without inspection or violate the
conditions of their admittance),9 as well as U.S. citizens or aliens who violate the
criminal provisions of the INA (e.g., marriage fraud or alien smuggling).
Some of the duties under immigration law have aspects of immigration
enforcement but also contain adjudicative functions (sometimes referred to as
services) and are not universally considered enforcement.  Immigration inspectors are
the classic example of this “dual” role, as inspectors are responsible for keeping those
who seek to harm U.S. interests out while letting bona fide travelers in.  An alien
who is denied entry to the United States by an inspector has not violated any
provision of the INA, unless the alien has committed some type of fraud to gain
entry.  Indeed, there have been people (both aliens and U.S. citizens) who have been
wrongly denied entry by an immigration inspector. It could also be argued that a
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) adjudicator is performing an enforcement function by denying an alien’s
application for a benefit to which he is not entitled.  Others would argue that this is
CRS-4
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an example of a purely adjudicative function, for unless the alien has committed
fraud to receive the benefit, he or she has not committed a violation under the INA.
According to DHS, immigration enforcement should be viewed as part of a
comprehensive homeland security strategy that unifies and coordinates law
enforcement operations across formerly separate agencies (e.g., the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), the Federal Protective Service, the U.S. Coast Guard,
and the U.S. Customs Service).10  The former Commissioner of INS,11 James Zigler,
was quoted as saying, “We need to set up a regime where we don’t have to spend so
much of our time and effort in enforcement activities dealing with people who are not
terrorists, who are not threats to our national security, who are economic refugees.”12
Some argue that since the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks were aliens,
immigration enforcement has recently had an anti-terrorism focus. Moreover, the
Center for Immigration Studies  found that at least 22 of the 48 al Qaeda foreign-born
terrorists found operating in the United States since 1993 had committed significant
violations of immigration laws.13  Thus, it can be argued that more stringent
enforcement of the immigration laws may have disrupted some of the terrorists’
plans.
Authority to Conduct Immigration Enforcement14
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, is the primary law by
which Congress legislates on immigration.15  Basic enforcement authority for
immigration officials stems from §287 and §235 of the INA.16  INA §287 gives any
officer or employee of the former INS (now employees of the DHS) authorized under
regulation prescribed by the Attorney General (now the Secretary of DHS) the
general power, without a warrant, to interrogate aliens, make arrests, conduct
CRS-5
17
 References to the Attorney General or the Commissioner of the former INS are now
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searches, board vessels, and administer oaths.17  INA §235 authorizes “immigration
officers” to inspect all aliens who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking
admission or readmission to or transit through the United States.  As evidenced
above, the INA makes no distinction in its law enforcement provisions between the
various types of employees or officers of the former INS (e.g., border patrol (USBP),
investigators, and deportation officers).  Rather, it is through regulation where
specific types of DHS personnel, including the USBP, are authorized and designated
to conduct certain law enforcement activities.18
Overview of Select Major Immigration Enforcement 
Legislation since 1986
Since 1986, there have been several bills with major immigration enforcement
provisions. The following highlights some of the most important enacted legislation
for immigration enforcement activities in the United States, and provides a brief
summary of the important changes. The enacted immigration enforcement legislation
includes the:
! Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA; P.L. 99-603),
which addressed the control of illegal immigration by creating
sanctions for employers who hire or continue to employ aliens who
are not authorized to work, and by legalizing most of the
unauthorized aliens present in the United States at that time;
! Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-
322), which gave the Attorney General the option to bypass
deportation proceedings for certain alien aggravated felons,
enhanced penalties for alien smuggling and reentry after deportation,
and increased appropriations for the border patrol;
! Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA; P.L. 104-208), which added to the grounds of
inadmissibility and deportability, expanded the list of crimes
constituting an aggravated felony, created expedited removal
procedures, and reduced the judicial review of immigration
decisions;
! USA Patriot Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56), which broadened the
terrorism grounds for excluding aliens from entering the United
States, and increased monitoring of foreign students;
! Enhanced Border Control and Visa Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-
173), which required the development of an interoperable electronic
data system to be used to share information relevant to alien
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admissibility and removability, and required the implementation of
an integrated entry-exit data system;19
! Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), which transferred
the majority of INS’ functions to DHS, leaving the Executive Office
of Immigration Review in the Department of Justice;20
! National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), which
expanded the grounds of inadmissibility and deportability,
accelerated the deployment of the entry/exit system, and increased
criminal penalties for alien smuggling;21 and
! REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13), which established statutory
guidelines for removal cases, expanded the terrorism-related grounds
for inadmissibility and deportation, included measures to improve
border infrastructure, and required states to verify an applicant’s
legal status before issuing a driver’s license or personal
identification card that may be accepted for any federal purpose.22
Interior vs. Border
Although many make the distinction between interior and border enforcement,
questions have been raised about the usefulness of the distinction. Many immigration
professionals do not accept the rationale that there is a distinct interior enforcement
mission, since interior enforcement can be viewed as a continuum of border
enforcement (i.e., violators not caught at the border, must be apprehended and
processed in the interior).23  However, certain aspects of interior enforcement lack a
border component. For example, fugitive taskforces, investigations of alien slavery
and sweatshops, and employer sanctions do not require close coordination between
DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and DHS Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). As an illustration that not all enforcement activities contain a
border component, in FY2004, CBP referrals accounted for only 23% of all ICE
criminal investigations.24
Interior Enforcement Strategies.  A Government Accountability Study
(GAO) report in October 2004 found that although ICE does not have a formal
interior enforcement strategy, all the objectives contained in INS interior enforcement
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strategy have been incorporated within a broader mission to strengthen homeland
security.25  INS interior enforcement strategy, issued in 1999, was designed to
address, in order of priority, (1) the detention and removal of criminal aliens, (2) the
dismantling and diminishing of alien smuggling and trafficking operations, (3)
community complaints about illegal immigration including those of law enforcement,
(4) immigrant benefit and document fraud,  and (5) employers’ use of unauthorized
aliens.  Overall, the strategy aimed to deter illegal immigration, prevent immigration
related crimes, and remove those illegally in the United States.
Two ICE offices, the Office of Investigations (OI) and the Office of Detention
and Removal (DRO), bear the primary responsibility for immigration interior
enforcement functions.26  OI is responsible for addressing smuggling and trafficking
in aliens, benefit fraud, responding to community complaints of illegal immigrations,
and worksite enforcement.27  DRO is responsible for identifying and removing
criminal aliens with some assistance from OI.28  In addition, the compliance unit
within ICE’s National Security Investigations Division analyzes data from various
databases, such as United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
(US-VISIT) Program and the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
(SEVIS), to identify those who may have violated the terms of their entry or be a risk
to national security.
Border Enforcement.  Border enforcement includes inspections at ports of
entry (POEs) and the patrolling of areas between POEs.29  In 1994, the USBP strategy
to deter illegal entry was “prevention through deterrence,” i.e., to raise the risk of
being apprehended to the point where aliens would find it futile to try to enter.  The
strategy called for placing USBP resources and manpower directly at the areas of
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greatest illegal immigration in order to detect, deter, and apprehend aliens attempting
to cross the border between official points of entry.30
After September 11, 2001, the USBP refocused its strategy on preventing the
entry of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction.  In order to prevent and deter
terrorist entry,  intelligence and surveillance operations have been focused on known
smuggling operations that have previously trafficked aliens from significant interest
countries. The USBP also coordinates and shares intelligence with Canadian and
Mexican authorities. It is important to note, however, that the increased emphasis on
preventing terrorist entry into the United States did not change the scope of the
USBP’s mission — preventing unauthorized aliens from entering the country.  There
is evidence that although border enforcement has increased, forcing aliens to take
more dangerous routes to enter the United States, and increasing the risks and costs
of those attempting to illegally enter the United States, the number of unauthorized
aliens in the United States has continued to increase.31
Types of Immigration Enforcement
The INA includes both criminal and civil components, providing both for
criminal charges (e.g., alien smuggling, which is prosecuted in the federal courts) and
for civil violations (e.g., lack of legal status, which may lead to removal through a
separate administrative system in the Department of Justice).32  Being illegally
present in the U.S. has always been a civil, not criminal, violation of the INA, and
subsequent deportation and associated administrative processes are civil
proceedings.33  For instance, a lawfully admitted nonimmigrant alien may become
deportable if his visitor’s visa expires or if his student status changes. Criminal
violations of the INA, on the other hand, include felonies and misdemeanors and are
prosecuted in federal district courts. These types of violations include the bringing
in and harboring of certain undocumented aliens (INA §274), the illegal entry of
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aliens (INA §275), and the reentry of aliens previously excluded or deported (INA
§276).34
Removal (Deportation)
An alien is “removable” if (1) the alien has not been admitted to the United
States and is inadmissible under INA §212,35 or (2) the alien has been admitted to the
United States and is deportable under INA §237.  The Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) combined “exclusion” and
“deportation” proceedings into a single removal proceeding.  INA §237 specifies six
broad classes of deportable aliens including aliens who:
! are inadmissible at time of entry or violate their immigration status;36
! commit certain criminal offenses (e.g., crimes of moral turpitude,37
aggravated felonies,38 alien smuggling, high speed flight); 
! fail to register (if required under law) or commit document fraud;
! are security risks (such as aliens who violate any law relating to
espionage, engage in criminal activity which endangers public
safety, partake in terrorist activities, or assisted in Nazi persecution
or genocide);
! become a public charge within five years of entry;39 or
! vote unlawfully.
In removal proceedings an immigration judge (IJ) from the Department of
Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) determines whether an
alien is removable.  The proceeding commences when the alien is issued a notice to
appear (NTA) which can be issued by a variety of DHS personnel including border
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patrol officers in CBP, asylum and examination officers in USCIS, and detention
officers in ICE.40
With certain exceptions, a removal proceeding under INA §240 is the “exclusive
procedure” for determining whether an alien should be removed from the United
States.  These exceptions include expedited removal (INA §235, and removal
proceedings under the Institutional Removal Program (IRP).  Those who are removed
are subject to bars to reenter the country.41
The courts have ruled that removal proceedings are civil not criminal, and that
deportation is not punishment.  Thus, there is no right to counsel, no right to a jury
trial, and the due process protections are less than in a criminal trial.  Furthermore,
a decision on removablity does not have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  In
addition, because deportation is not punishment, Congress may impose new
immigration consequences for actions that previously occurred (i.e., actions that
would not have made the alien deportable when they occurred may make the alien
deportable at a later date if Congress changes the law).42
Expedited Removal.43  Under expedited removal, an alien who lacks proper
documentation or has committed fraud or willful misrepresentation of facts to gain
admission into the United States is inadmissible and may be removed from the
United States without any further hearings or review,44 unless the alien indicates
either an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution.45
Aliens subject to expedited removal must be detained until they are removed
and may only be released due to medical emergency or if necessary for law
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enforcement purposes.  Although under law the Attorney General46 may apply
expedited removal to any alien who has not been admitted or paroled47 into the
United States and cannot show that they have been continuously present for two
years, expedited removal has only been applied to aliens
! arriving at ports of entry; 
! arriving by sea who are not admitted or paroled; and, recently,
! who are present without being admitted or paroled, are encountered
by an immigration officer within 100 air miles of the U.S.
international land border, and have not established to the satisfaction
of an immigration officer that they have been physically present in
the United States continuously for the 14-day period immediately
preceding the date of encounter.
Institutional Removal Program.  INA §238(a) allows for removal
proceedings to be conducted at federal, state, and local prisons for aliens convicted
of crimes.  This program as instituted is known as the Institutional Removal Program
(IRP).  Under the IRP, the proceedings are held while the alien is incarcerated.
Nonetheless, under the INA aliens must complete their criminal sentences before they
can be removed from the United States.48  INS developed a nationwide automated
tracking system for the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and deployed them to IRP
sites.  The system covers foreign born inmates incarcerated under the federal system
and tracks the hearing status of each inmate.49
Removal Proceedings.  As discussed above, when DHS encounters an alien
that it thinks should be removed from the United States, the alien is presented a
notice to appear (NTA), which commences the removal proceeding.  The NTA
outlines the charges against the alien and identifies the part of the INA that the alien
is being charged with violating.  If the alien is not subject to mandatory detention
(discussed below), the alien may be detained, or released on bond or his own
recognizance (OR).50
In a court removal proceeding an ICE attorney (i.e., the government’s attorney)
must prove the charges in the NTA, witnesses are presented, and the immigration
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judge rules on whether the alien is removable from the United States or is eligible for
relief from removal.51  An alien who fails to appear for a removal hearing (absent
exceptional circumstances) can be removed in absentia and becomes inadmissible for
five years,52 and ineligible for relief from removal for 10 years.53  Within 30 days
after the hearing, the government’s attorney or the alien may appeal the decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in EOIR.  After the BIA decision the alien
may appeal to a federal court.
Voluntary Departure.  The majority of aliens who are removed do not
undergo formal removal proceedings in front of an IJ. Most aliens are given the
opportunity to depart voluntarily from the United States, and most of them agree to
voluntary departure.54  At the border, voluntary departure is only available for aliens
from contiguous territories (i.e., Canada and Mexico), and aliens  are escorted to the
point of departure.55  CBP inspectors also can permit an alien traveling through a
POE to withdraw their application for admission and return to their point of origin.
Aliens who do not take one of these options (and are not under expedited removal),
when offered, are subject to formal removal proceedings in front of a DOJ
immigration judge and ICE’s Office of Detention and Removal (DRO) assumes
responsibility for the alien’s custody management (detention or release, and possible
reapprehension of released aliens) and removal of the alien (which may include
escorting the alien to their home country).56
In addition, certain aliens who have been issued NTA’s may request voluntary
departure before (in lieu of), during or after formal removal proceedings. Criminal
aliens are ineligible for voluntary departure. The DHS officer or the IJ must specify
the period of time allowed for departure57 and may  impose conditions, such as bond
or detention, deemed necessary to assure the alien’s departure.58  Voluntary departure
is not available to any alien who was previously allowed to depart voluntarily.
Furthermore, aliens who fail to depart within the time period specified for voluntary
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departure are subject to monetary penalties and ineligible for voluntary departure or
other relief from removal for 10 years.
Voluntary departure costs less than formal removal since, in most cases, the
government does not have to pay for the alien’s repatriation.  In addition, the
resources that would be needed if all aliens apprehended along the borders were
subject to formal removal proceedings would be prohibitive.  Nonetheless, in the
interior, many aliens subject to voluntary departure fail to leave the country. It is
estimated that each year, 40,000 non-detained aliens fail to leave the United States
as ordered (either under voluntary departure or as ordered by an IJ).59
Absconder Initiative.  Designed by the Office of Detention and Removal
(DRO) in January 2002, and run by both DRO and OI, the National Fugitive
Operations Program (NFOP) seeks to apprehend, process, and remove aliens who
have failed to comply with removal orders.  As part of the Alien Absconder Initiative,
NFOP teams work exclusively on fugitive cases, giving priority to aliens convicted
of crimes.60  The absconder initiative was the first  systematic attempt to enforce
every final removal order issued.61  Nonetheless, as Figure 1 shows, although there
has been a concerted effort since FY2002 to remove absconders, the number of
absconders went from 376,003 in FY2002 to 536,644 in FY2005, an increase of 43%
in three years.  However, this increase could be due to the increase in aliens who are
given final orders of removal.  In FY2001, 282,396 aliens received final orders of
removal, while in FY2005, 368,848 final orders were issued.62
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Criminal Aliens.  Criminal aliens are aliens who have committed crimes that
make them removable. The potential pool of removable criminal aliens is in the
hundreds of thousands. Some are incarcerated in federal, state, or local facilities,
while others are free across the United States, because they have already served their
criminal sentences.63 DHS’ Criminal Alien Program is directed at identifying
criminal aliens in federal, state, and local prisons, and assuring that these aliens are
taken into ICE custody at the completion of their criminal sentences. Although
federal prisons have a system to notify ICE when there is an alien in custody,
notification from state and local prisons and jails is not systematic, and many
criminal aliens are released after their criminal sentences are completed rather than
taken into ICE custody, making it more difficult to locate the aliens for deportation
and raising the concern that the released aliens will commit new crimes.  Like ICE,
INS had historically failed to identify all removable imprisoned aliens.64
Removal Statistics.  The number of removals has declined since FY2000
(See Figure 2).  In FY2000, INS removed 1.9 million aliens, the largest number of
aliens removed in a single year. The total number of removals declined from FY2000
to FY2003, but increased in FY2004.
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Figure 1.  Number of Alien Absconders, FY2000-FY2005
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The decline in total removals was due primarily to a decrease in the number of
voluntary departures.  As Figure 3 shows, the number of formal removals
significantly increased after FY1996, when the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 made more crimes deportable offenses,
increasing the number of aliens required to undergo formal removal proceedings.65
In FY1996, there were 69,680 formal removals.  The number of formal removals
continuously increased between FY1996 and FY2000, then decreased in FY2001 and
FY2002.  The decrease between FY2001 and FY2002, may have been the result of
a backlog in cases before the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).66  Since FY2002,
the number of formal removals has increased, reaching an all-time high of  204,193
aliens in FY2005. The increase in formal removals in FY2003, could be attributed
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Figure 2.  Types of Removals:  FY1995-FY2004
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to the Attorney General’s decision to streamline the immigration appeals process, see
discussion below.
As previously noted, most of the removals from the United States are voluntary
departures as opposed to formal removals.  Figure 2 illustrates the percent of formal
removals compared to all removals increased steadily between FY1996 and FY2003,
and then decreased in slightly between FY2003 and FY2004.  The decrease was most
likely the result of a decrease in apprehensions along the border (discussed below).
In FY1996, 4.2% of all removals were formal removals, compared to 17.6% in
FY2003.  In FY2004, 16.4% of all removed aliens went through the formal removal
process.
Source:  FY1996-FY1997 from Immigration and Naturalization Service, FY1997 Statistical Yearbook
of the INS.  FY1998-FY2004 from DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, FY2004 Yearbook of
Immigration Statistics, January 2006, p. 162.  FY2005, DHS, FY2005 Monthly Statistical Report,
Year End, September 2005.
In addition, as Figure 3 demonstrates, since FY1996, the majority of aliens
formally removed were noncriminal aliens.  In FY1996, 53.7% of all formal
removals were criminal aliens; since then, noncriminal aliens have comprised the
majority of formally removed aliens.  In FY2005, 42.7% of formally removed aliens
were criminal aliens.
As shown in Figure 4, the three most common reasons for formal removals are
(1) attempted illegal entry; (2) criminal grounds (i.e., committing a crime in the
United States); and (3) not in status (i.e., unlawful presence).  In addition, the
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proportion of the formally removed population which was removed due to being
previously removed increased almost threefold between 1995 and 2004.
Source:  DHS, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, FY2004.
Selected Removal Issues.  The government’s ability to remove aliens who
do not have permission to be in the United States, or have violated the terms of their
admission (e.g., aliens who commit crimes) has been an issue of continual interest
for Congress.  As discussed above, there are an estimated 11 million unauthorized
aliens residing in the United States.  Following is a discussion of some of the reasons
why the removal policy has been unable to keep pace with the unauthorized
population.
Number of Investigators.  On June 4, 2002, the INS had 1,944 on-duty
special agents including supervisors, fewer than the number of officers in the Dallas
police department.67  In any given day, there were only 1,365 special agents to
investigate fraud and smuggling cases, conduct enforcement operations at work sites,
support local task forces, respond to local law enforcement officials, arrest
immigration violators, and assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in their
counterterrorism work.68  The number of agents has a direct impact on the ability of
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Figure 4.  Formal Removal by Reason:  FY1995 and FY2004
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ICE to be able to remove unauthorized aliens, as ICE agents are charged with
locating and arresting removable aliens. In 2002, there were an estimated 9.3 million
unauthorized aliens in the United States, which was approximately 4,784
unauthorized aliens per special agent.
The number of ICE special agents increased from a total of 5,449 in FY2003 to
5,614 in FY2004, and 5,769 in FY2005.69  However, since agents from the former
INS and the former U.S. Customs Service were combined into ICE, it is unknown
what percentage of time the ICE special agents spend on immigration enforcement
functions compared to tasks of the former U.S. Customs Service.  As a result, it is not
known if and to what extent the number of agents devoted to immigration
enforcement has increased since the creation of DHS.
Executive Office for Immigration Review.  The ability to remove aliens
is also influenced by the functioning of the immigration courts, as formally removed
aliens who are not in expedited removal are entitled to a hearing before the courts.
In FY2002, there was concern about the backlog of cases before the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA).70  As a result, then Attorney General John Ashcroft,
made changes to streamline the appellate review within the immigration courts.
Recently, there has been an increase in immigration cases before the federal
appeals courts.  As Figure 5 shows, between FY2000 and FY2005, the number of
appeals has increased sevenfold, while the number of cases heard by BIA during the
same time increased 43%.  Immigration cases increased from 3.2% of the federal
appeals court’s workload in FY2000, to 18% of the workload in FY2005. In addition,
some federal appeals judges have harshly criticized the BIA and immigration judges.
Some appeals judges argue that the streamlining of the BIA has shifted the work to
their courts.71  When a federal appeals judge overturns the decision of an immigration
judge, the case is returned to EOIR to be heard by a different immigration judge,
increasing the alien’s time in removal proceedings (i.e., the length of the removal
process) and increasing the use of EOIR resources.  If the alien is being detained, the
delay in finalizing a removal decision also increases the consumption of detention
resources.
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Long-Term Residents and Children.  In addition, there are some policy
concerns surrounding the deportation of aliens who have lived in the United States
for many years and established community ties.  Deportation (removal) can be
controversial and seem punitive for those who have been in the United States for long
periods of time and for those who entered the United States as young children and
know no other country.  Long term residents often have to abandon homes and
businesses when they are deported.  In addition, these aliens often have ties in the
communities where they reside, which can result in a backlash when the government
attempts to remove the alien.72
Furthermore, some countries (e.g., Vietnam) refuse to accept the return of their
nationals who entered the United States as children.  These children often have few
ties to their birth countries, and may not speak the language.73  If the alien is being
deported due to a criminal act, the home countries often contend that since U.S.
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society created the person’s antisocial behavior, the United States should take
responsibility for the person.  However, others note that if these aliens had not
violated the laws of the United States they would not be removable.
Detention
The INA (§236) provides broad authority to detain aliens while awaiting a
determination of whether they should be removed from the United States, and
specifies categories of aliens subject to mandatory detention.74  Aliens not subject to
mandatory detention may be detained, paroled, or released on bond or their own
recognizance.  Decisions on parole made by the Secretary of DHS and bond decisions
made by the Attorney General are not subject to review.  Aliens paroled or released
may be rearrested at any time.
The large majority of detained aliens have committed a crime while in the
United States, have served their criminal sentence, and are detained while undergoing
removal proceedings.  Other detained aliens include those who arrive at a port of
entry without proper documentation (i.e., expedited removal), but most of these
aliens are quickly returned to their country of origin.75  The majority of aliens arriving
without proper documentation who claim asylum are held until their “credible fear
hearing,” but some of these aliens are held until their asylum claims have been
adjudicated.
The Office of Detention and Removal (DRO) in ICE is responsible for the daily
detention of aliens, but under law the Attorney General may still retain the authority
to arrest and detain aliens.  The Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) amended the INA, effectively specifying levels
of detention priority and classes of aliens subject to mandatory detention.  Mandatory
detention is required for certain criminal and terrorist aliens who are removable,
pending a final decision on whether the alien is to be removed.
In October 1998, the former INS issued a memorandum establishing detention
guidelines consistent with the changes made by IIRIRA.76  According to the
guidelines, detainees are assigned to one of four detention categories:  (1) required,
(2) high priority, (3) medium priority, and (4) lower priority.77  Aliens in required
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detention are mandatory detainees,78 while aliens in the other categories may be
detained depending on detention space and the facts of the case.  Higher priority
aliens should be detained before aliens of lower priority.79 Additionally, the USA-
PATRIOT Act80 amended the INA to create a new section (236A), which requires the
detention of an alien whom the Attorney General certifies as someone the Attorney
General has “reasonable grounds” to believe is involved in terrorist activities or in
any other activity that endangers national security.
In June 2005, 87% of detention bed space was filled with mandatory detainees,
making bed space scarce and increasing the need for both good management of
detention space, and alternative forms of detention.81  A lack of bedspace can lead to
an increase in the number of apprehended aliens who must be released into the
community, and aliens who are not detained are less likely to appear for their
removal proceedings and to leave the country if they are ordered removed.  For
example, in FY2005, 60% of nondetained aliens failed to appear for their removal
hearing.82  Moreover, only 18% of aliens released into the community who
subsequently receive final removal orders leave the United States.83  To counteract
the high percentage of nondetained aliens who fail to leave the United States, DHS
has a pilot program which began in Hartford, Connecticut, and was expanded to
Atlanta and Denver in March 2004, that immediately detains all aliens subject to final
orders of removal, so that ICE can ensure that the aliens depart from the United
States.
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Detention Statistics. Although Congress increased the number of DRO
officer positions by 25% between FY2004 and FY2005, the actual number of officers
increased only slightly (see Figure 6), affecting the ability of DRO to detain and
remove aliens.  From FY2003 to FY2004, the number of officer positions increased
by only six, but the actual number of officers working increased by 139, as the
number of vacancies deceased.  From FY2004 to FY2005, although the total number
of officers increased by 788,  the  number of filled positions increased slightly, from
2,842 to 2,871, while the number of vacancies increased almost threefold.  The lack
of actual hires was the result of financial management issues, which lead to a hiring
freeze in ICE and DRO between March 2004 and May 2005.84
As Figure 7 shows, between FY1994 and FY2001 the average size of the daily
noncitizen detention population increased steadily.  There was a slight decrease in the
size of the detention population between FY2001 and FY2002, and then a steady
increase between FY2002 and FY2004.  The daily population decreased between
FY2004 and FY2005 and then increased in the beginning of FY2006. The size of the
daily population increased by 129%, from 9,011 to 20,594, between FY1996, when
IIRIRA was enacted, and FY2006.  The largest increase occurred between FY1997
and FY1998, the year that all the provisions of the IIRIRA became enforceable.
Some argue that the size of the detained population is dependent on the amount of
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detention space.  Thus, the increase in the detained population after FY1998 reflects
an increase in detention space, not in the number of people eligible to be detained.
Figure 7 reveals that generally the daily detention population is higher than the
funded number of beds.  In FY2003 through FY2005, on average there were more
than 1,000 aliens detained above funded bedspace, which implies that the funding to
detain these aliens needs to be taken from elsewhere in DRO’s or ICE’s budget.  In
FY2006, so far the funded number of beds has outpaced the daily population.
Selected Detention Issues.  Since most nondetained aliens remain illegally
in the United States, the detention of noncitizens relative to the availability of
bedspace has been an ongoing Congressional issue.85  Many contend that DHS does
not have enough detention space to house all those who should be detained.  They
contend that the increase in the number of classes of aliens subject to mandatory
detention has impacted the availability of detention space for lower priority detainees.
There are over half a million aliens in the United States who have been ordered
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deported who are presumed to still be in the country.  Some argue that these aliens
would have left the country if they had been detained once they were ordered
deported.  As discussed above, only 18% of nondetained aliens with final orders of
removal leave the United States.  On the other hand, 94% of detained aliens who
were part of the Hartford Pilot (mentioned above)  were deported.  Concerns have
been raised that decisions about which aliens to release and when to release them
may be based on the amount of detention space, not on the merits of individual cases,
and that the amount of space may vary by area of the country, leading to inequities
and disparate policies in different geographic areas.86
Furthermore, the overall increase in the number of noncitizens in DHS detention
has raised questions about the cost of detaining noncitizens.  For FY2004, DHS
budgeted $80 a day for each detainee held in detention.87  This cost does not include
transportation or the cost of deporting the alien.
Coordination between CBP and ICE.  Reportedly, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement’s (ICE’s) funding and accounting difficulties, as well as the
failure to coordinate planning and budgets between ICE and Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) has contributed to a resource imbalance.  As CBP’s apprehension
capabilities grew, ICE’s detention and removal capabilities did not.  The imbalance
has placed an increasing strain on the Office of Detention and Removal (DRO)
resources, as well as impacted CBP’s alien apprehensions.
There is no organizational requirement that CBP notify ICE’s DRO of its
apprehension initiatives and expected need for detention resources.  Similarly, ICE
is under no obligation to notify CBP about any new initiatives which may impact the
availability of detention and removal resources.88  In addition, although at points
DRO units are responsible for the transport of aliens in CBP custody, some CBP
officials have said that DRO is not providing the level of transport required, and as
a result, the United States Border Patrol has had to assume an increasing share of
transportation responsibilities.89  Improved coordination between the ICE and CBP
may have reduced the negative impact of this resource imbalance; however, DRO’s
removal functions are ultimately governed by appropriations.  Better coordination can
improve allocation of limited resources but the agency is still constrained by the
funds available for detention space and removal costs.90
CRS-25
91
 The INA also establishes fines for transportation companies and employees of these
companies (e.g., airlines, cruise lines, bus companies) who bring into the United States any
alien who does not have a valid passport and, if required, an unexpired visa (§§271, 273).
92
 INA §§277, 278.
93
 In Dec. 2000, the United States and over 120 other countries signed the UN Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, and more than 75 of these countries signed the
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, which seeks to combat
organized crime by harmonizing nations’ criminal laws and promoting increased
cooperation. Although the convention and the protocol have entered into force, the United
States has not ratified the convention.
94
 Nonetheless, some ICE officers report that there has been a rise in smugglers holding the
aliens hostage while extorting money from the alien’s family.  Personal communication with
Patricia Schmidt, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Phoenix Immigration and Customs
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Alien Smuggling and Trafficking
The INA specifies criminal penalties for bringing in and harboring certain
aliens, commonly referred to as alien smuggling.  Specifically, INA §274 prohibits
and specifies penalties for any person who:
! attempts to bring in an alien at any place other than a POE;
! knowing or in reckless disregard that an alien is illegally present
transports the alien within the United States; 
! conceals, harbors, or shields the alien knowing or in reckless
disregard that the alien is illegally present; and 
! encourages or induces an alien to come to the United States,
knowing or in reckless disregard that the alien will be illegally
present.91
In addition, there are separate penalties for any person who aids or assists an alien
who is inadmissible on criminal or security grounds, or brings in an alien for immoral
purposes.92
Alien smuggling is a transnational crime due to the fact that it involves more
than one country,93 and typically the alien has consented (even paid) to be smuggled.
In most cases when the aliens reach their destination, they have no continuing
relationship with the smuggler.94  In human trafficking, the alien may agree to be
smuggled into the United States, but once they arrive they are subjected to exploitive
arrangements, including prostitution or forced labor, that produce long-term profits
for the trafficker.  Under immigration law, a trafficked alien is a victim, while an
alien who consents to be smuggled may be subject to criminal prosecution and
deportation.
Alien smuggling and trafficking investigations are often complicated by
language and humanitarian issues (e.g., the alien has been traumatized and is unable
to aid in the investigation), as well as logistical challenges and difficulties (e.g.,
transporting, housing, and processing aliens). In addition, certain types of
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investigative techniques, such as controlled delivery operations,95 cannot be used as
humans are involved.  Moreover, unlike drug trafficking cases where the contraband
itself is proof of the illegal activity, the successful prosecution of alien smuggling
cases relies on the availability of witnesses (unauthorized aliens) who may refuse to
testify because of fear of retribution against themselves or their families.96
Many contend that alien smuggling of persons into the United States constitutes
a significant risk to national security and public safety.97  Since smugglers facilitate
the illegal entry of persons into the United States, terrorists may use smuggling routes
and organizations to enter undetected.  It is estimated that the international alien
smuggling and sex trafficking trade generates $9.5 billion for criminal organizations
worldwide, and the profits are used to finance additional criminal enterprises, such
as the trafficking of drugs, weapons, or other contraband.98
In addition to generating billions of dollars in revenues for criminal
enterprises,99 alien smuggling can lead to collateral crimes including kidnaping,
homicide, assault, rape, robbery, auto theft, high speed flight, vehicle accidents,
identity theft, and the manufacturing and distribution of fraudulent documents.  For
example, smugglers may  hold an  alien hostage to extort a ransom from the alien’s
family.100  In addition, smugglers often establish “safe houses” (also called “drop
houses”) where aliens are kept until they can be moved into the interior of the United
States.  The often squalid conditions of these “safe houses” endanger the lives of the
aliens and create health and safety issues for people living in the community.101  Also,
others note an increase in traffic accident causalities due to the unsafe condition of
vehicles used by smugglers. (Often smugglers rig the vehicles to hide as many aliens
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as possible, making the vehicle unsafe to operate.)102  Some border deaths are tied to
smuggling, as some smugglers mislead their charges about how far it is to the United
States and how much water is needed to make the journey.103
Alien smuggling-related activities may be prosecuted under a variety of criminal
statutes including immigration document fraud and bribery.104  In addition, other
federal crimes may be applicable as alien smuggling is listed among the Racketeer
Influence and Corrupt Organization (RICO)105 predicate offenses and is included in
the definition of specified unlawful activities for money laundering statutes.106
Furthermore, criminal and civil forfeiture statues107 may apply to alien smuggling
cases.  From October to March FY2005,  ICE reported the seizure of $7.8 million
from alien smuggling investigations.
DHS’ Role in the Anti-Smuggling Effort.  Under the INS, two separate
entities in the organization, the border patrol (USBP) and the INS investigations
program, conducted alien smuggling investigations.  The Government Accountability
Office (GAO) found that due to a lack of program coordination between the two INS
entities, there were several anti-smuggling units that overlapped in their jurisdictions,
operated autonomously, and reported to different officials.108  The abolishment of the
INS and the transfer of its functions to DHS may have resolved some of these issues.
According to an ICE Office of Investigations (OI) official, the border patrol has a
minor role in alien smuggling and trafficking and is required to coordinate with OI
before initiating anti-smuggling investigations.109  Nonetheless, it is unclear that this
coordination is functioning smoothly. (Recently a sting was compromised because
of lack of coordination between ICE and CBP when ICE agents were trying to cross
the border with money and drugs to uncover the entire smuggling operation.)110
ICE’s Anti-Smuggling Role.  ICE works to identify and dismantle large-
scale transnational smuggling organizations in collaboration with other law
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enforcement agencies, both foreign and domestic. Major investigations are conducted
with the cooperation and assistance of other federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies, as well as the appropriate bureaus of foreign governments.111  ICE reports
that it coordinates the anti-smuggling efforts of all divisions in DHS, including
investigations offices, overseas offices, inspections at ports-of-entry (POEs), and
Border Patrol units between POEs.112  It is also the primary DHS component for
investigating alien smuggling, but Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the U.S
Coast Guard are also involved.
ICE is developing a foreign and domestic strategy to combat alien smuggling
which includes implementing critical incident response teams, and using the money
laundering statutes and the identification and seizure of assets and criminal proceeds
to strip away the assets and profit incentive of smuggling organizations.113
Nonetheless, reportedly ICE has not finalized its strategy for combating alien
smuggling. Begun in summer 2003 — soon after the formation of DHS — the
strategy is being adjusted to focus on the southwest border and to encompass the
smuggling of aliens, drugs, and other contraband.114
ICE places a significant emphasis on targeting alien smuggling organizations
that present threats to national security, recognizing that terrorists are likely to align
themselves with alien smuggling networks to obtain undetected entry into the United
States.115  It is widely believed that there are factors which have created an
environment in which terrorist and smuggling enterprises may combine their criminal
efforts to pose a significant threat to national security.  These factors include the
increase in sophistication of criminal organizations, the ability of these organizations
to exploit public corruption, and the lax immigration controls in transit countries.  In
addition, smuggling pipelines that are used by unauthorized aliens and criminals
seeking to enter the United States could also be used by terrorists to gain entrance
into the United States.116 DHS’ global Anti-Smuggling/Human Trafficking Strategy
concentrates efforts on intelligence-driven investigations against major violators,
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specifically targeting organizations with ties to countries that support terrorist
organizations such as al Qaeda.117
CBP’s Anti-Smuggling Role.  The U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) in CBP is
responsible for interdicting aliens smuggled between ports of entry. Generally, after
the USBP makes an interdiction, the smuggled aliens are separated from members
of the smuggling organization; interviews are conducted of both groups; sworn
statements are solicited from material witnesses; fingerprints are taken; and other
relevant information is accumulated.  CBP refers to ICE’s Office of Investigations
only those cases that involve a significant scope, violence, or other egregious
circumstances.  The USBP also makes referrals to ICE based on more in-depth or
strategic analyses conducted by USBP’s intelligence units which routinely analyze
alien-smuggling interdictions to develop information on smuggling patterns and
identify leads warranting further investigation.118
ICE and CBP Smuggling Memorandum of Understanding.  A recent
GAO report noted that the effectiveness of ICE’s anti-smuggling strategy would
depend partly on the clarification of the ICE and CBP’s roles in anti-smuggling
activities.  In April 2004, ICE and CBP signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) which stated that,
! ICE would assume the full burden of administratively supporting,
equipping, and funding the anti-smuggling units.
! ICE would have lead responsibility for certain nationally designated
cases as well as Joint Terrorism Task Force cases. 
! USBP would have responsibility for border-related interdiction
activities, including checkpoint operations.
! USBP and ICE would be jointly responsible for ensuring the proper
and timely sharing of information and intelligence.
! There is a need to develop a more comprehensive agreement
regarding the working relationship between ICE investigations and
CBP.
In November 2004, ICE and CBP signed a second MOU addressing the bureaus’
roles and responsibilities, including provisions for sharing information and
intelligence.  The MOU reiterated that ICE’s Office of Investigations has primary
responsibility for all investigations, while the  USBP has primary responsibility for
interdictions between ports of entry. Nonetheless, the MOU stated that the missions
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of the two bureaus “are intricately connected and complementary.”119  However, at
this time, there is no mechanism for tracking the status of cases referred to ICE by
CBP, which may cause the agency to miss opportunities to identify and investigate
large smuggling operations.120  In addition, there have reportedly been
communications issues between ICE and CBP during some smuggling
investigations.121
The Role of Other Federal Agencies.  Other federal agencies, including
the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
Attorney’s Office, Department of Treasury’s Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal
Division, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), play a role in
combating alien smuggling.  Likewise, since alien smuggling and document fraud are
often linked, the Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security also is
involved in the anti-smuggling effort due to its mission to protect travel documents.
Additionally, the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs coordinates international anti-smuggling efforts (e.g., helping
countries draft alien smuggling legislation, providing funds to foreign countries that
have intercepted smuggled aliens to assist in returning these aliens to their home
countries). The Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Office of Transnational Issues
provides analytical assessments related to alien smuggling, and the Department of
Defense’s National Security Agency (NSA) assists in the interdiction of smuggled
aliens overseas.122
Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center.   The Human Smuggling and
Trafficking Center (HSTC) is an interagency group — including the Departments of
Justice, State, and Homeland Security — which provides information to counter
migrant smuggling, trafficking of persons, and clandestine terrorist travel.  The
center’s three primary objectives are (1) prevention and deterrence of smuggling and
related trafficking activities, (2) investigation and prosecution of the criminals
involved in such activity, and (3) protection of and assistance for victims as provided
in applicable law and policy.123
Selected Alien Smuggling Issues.  The number of individuals smuggled
into the United States has increased dramatically, and smuggling organizations have
become more sophisticated.  Furthermore, there were concerns about the former INS’
ability to combat alien smuggling, and it is unknown how many of these problems
carried over into ICE.   For example, the INS lacked the field intelligence staff to
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collect and analyze information on alien smuggling.124  In addition, a 2000 GAO
report noted the lack of program coordination and the absence of an automated case
management system as impeding anti-smuggling efforts.125  
Nonetheless, the ability of DHS to combine alien smuggling and money
laundering investigations reportedly has aided in alien smuggling investigations.  ICE
has the ability to pursue money laundering charges related to smuggling since DHS
has the authorities of the former U.S. Customs Service.  This capacity did not exist
in INS, and INS would have had to seek outside assistance to pursue additional
charges.126  On the other hand, there have been reports of a lack of coordination on
alien smuggling between ICE and CBP which has lead to inefficiencies in alien
smuggling investigations.
Smuggling or Humanitarian Assistance.  The line between humanitarian
assistance and alien smuggling is not always clearly defined.  In 1986, the Reverend
John Fife was convicted of alien smuggling for his work in the “sanctuary
movement,” providing shelter to illegal aliens from Central American, most of whom
were fleeing civil wars.127  In July 2005, two volunteers from the group No More
Deaths, which provides water and medical care to unauthorized aliens crossing the
Arizona desert, were arrested and charged with alien smuggling.  According to the
volunteers, they were transporting three unauthorized aliens to a church in Tucson,
Arizona to provide medical care.  Nonetheless, the aliens were being transported in
furtherance of their  unlawful presence, and the group did not intend to notify
USBP.128
In addition, the group Humane Borders sets up water stations in the desert for
aliens trying to cross illegally into the United States and recently printed a map of the
routes through the Arizona desert into the United States, illustrating USBP beacons,
Humane Borders water stations, and migrant places of death.  According to the
group, the objective of the maps is to try to dissuade migrants from undertaking an
illegal border crossing by warning them of the risks.  However, others argue that
Humane Borders is aiding and abetting illegal entry, and is engaging in alien
smuggling.129
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Immigration Fraud
Defining Immigration Fraud.130  Immigration fraud is generally grouped into
two types — immigration-related document fraud and immigration benefit fraud.
! Immigration-related document fraud includes the counterfeiting, sale
and/or use of identity documents or “breeder documents” (i.e.,
documents used to confirm identity, such as birth certificates or
Social Security cards),131 as well as alien registration documents and
stamps, employment authorizations, passports, visas, or any
documents used to circumvent immigration laws.
! Benefit fraud encompasses the willful misrepresentation of a
material fact to obtain an immigration benefit in the absence of
lawful eligibility for that benefit.132
Some view immigration fraud as a continuum of events because people may commit
document fraud en route to benefit fraud.
The INA addresses immigration fraud in several ways.  First, the law makes
“misrepresentation” (e.g., obtaining a visa by falsely representing a material fact or
entering the United States by falsely claiming U.S. citizenship) a ground for
inadmissibility.133 Second, the INA has civil enforcement provisions, distinct from
removal or inadmissibility proceedings, to prosecute individuals and entities that
engage in immigration document fraud.134
In addition to the INA, §1546 of the U.S. Criminal Code makes it a criminal
offense for a person to knowingly produce, use, or facilitate the production or use of
fraudulent immigration documents such as visas, border crossing cards, and other
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documents covered by immigration-related statute or regulation.  The U.S. Criminal
Code furthermore criminalizes immigration fraud pertaining to the knowing
falsification of naturalization, citizenship, or alien registry.  More generally, the U.S.
Criminal Code criminalizes the knowing commission of fraud in connection with a
wide range of identification documents.135
Measuring Fraud.  Immigration fraud is reportedly widespread, though
estimates of its pervasiveness are not available.136  The conventional wisdom is that
document fraud increased following the enactment of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986, which first required employers to inspect the documents of
prospective employees.137  Large-scale black market enterprises providing counterfeit
immigration documents and “breeder” documents developed to supply unauthorized
alien workers with necessary papers.  Given that calculations based upon the 2005
Current Population Survey estimated that 11.1 million aliens were residing in the
United States without legal authorization, it is reasonable to presume that many of
these unauthorized aliens are committing document fraud.  Nonimmigrant visa fraud
among aliens temporarily in the United States has also been an ongoing problem.138
It is possible that many of those people who broker in immigration fraud are legal
residents or citizens of the United States.
Many policy analysts maintain that the pervasiveness of immigration fraud
facilitates the entry and assimilation of those aliens who pose threats to the United
States. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(commonly known as the 9/11 Commission) showed that several of 19 hijackers
responsible for the 9/11 attacks were able to obtain visas to enter the United States
through the use of forged documents.  Incomplete intelligence and screening enabled
many of the hijackers to enter the United States despite flaws in their entry
documents or suspicions regarding their past associations.  According to the 9/11
Commission, up to 15 of the hijackers could have been intercepted or deported
through more diligent enforcement of immigration laws.139
Investigating Fraud.  The types of fraud investigations range in
circumstances and scope.  Many investigations focus on facilitators, i.e., those who
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sell, distribute or manufacture counterfeit or altered documents and on criminal
organizations that broker large-scale illegal schemes such as sham marriage rings or
bogus job offers. Investigations of immigration benefit applications are another major
activity.
As immigration enforcement strategies have changed and resources have shifted
over time, it has long been evident that investigations of immigration fraud has
declined as a priority. In FY1986, for example, the productive workyears devoted to
fraud investigation reportedly equaled 256 special agents, and they completed 11,316
fraud cases. Ten years later (FY1995), there were 181 special agent workyears, and
they completed only 6,455 cases.140  When the INS issued its “Interior Enforcement
Strategy” in 1999, however, minimizing immigration benefit fraud and other
document abuse was listed as the fourth among five top priorities.141
Evaluations of the government’s efforts to combat immigration benefit fraud
and document abuse have generally been critical.142 GAO noted that “INS did not
believe it had sufficient staff to reach its program goals.” GAO also reported that
benefit fraud investigations were hampered by a lack of integrated information
systems. “The operations units at the four INS service centers that investigate benefit
fraud operate different information systems that did not interface with each other or
with the units that investigate benefit fraud at INS district offices. ... Thus, INS was
not in the best position to review numerous applications and detect patterns, trends,
and potential schemes for benefit fraud.”143
Staffing of Fraud Investigations.  The cuts in fraud investigations between
FY1992 and FY2003 appear to have been generally across the board in terms of types
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of investigations pursued.  As Figure 8 depicts, workyears spent investigating
facilitators of counterfeit or altered documents, organizations that broker large-scale
illegal schemes and persons suspected of immigration benefit fraud have all
decreased.  Note that the “all other” category in FY2003 includes the investigations
of civil violations of document fraud (INA §274C) that were enacted in1996, and
likely account for its relative increase.
Selected Fraud Issues.  There appears to be a continued lack of
coordination between U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and ICE
in the area of fraud and national security investigations.144 USCIS established the
Office of Fraud Detection and National Security to work with the appropriate law
enforcement entities to handle national security and criminal “hits” on aliens and to
identify systemic fraud in the application process.  Many of these duties were
formerly performed by the INS enforcement arm that is now part of ICE. The GAO
has reported, “The difficulty between USCIS and ICE investigations regarding
benefit fraud is not new....  As a result, some USCIS field officials told us that ICE
would not pursue single cases of benefit fraud. ICE field officials who spoke on this
Organizations
21.9%
Facilitators
53.4%
Immigration
22.3%
All other
2.4% Organizations
27.8%
Facilitators
34.7%
Immigration
33.6%
All other
4.0%
Source: CRS analysis of DHS Office of Immigration Statistics PAS data.
210.4 Work Years 136.8 Work Years
FY1992 FY2003
Figure 8.  Fraud Investigations by Type or Target, FY1992 and
FY2003 
CRS-36
145
 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Management Challenges Remain in
Transforming Immigration Programs, GAO-05-81, Oct. 2004.
146
 INA §§274A-274B.
147
 INA §274A, 8 U.S.C. §1324a.  For further discussion of these legal provisions, see CRS
Report RS22180, Unauthorized Employment of Aliens: Basics of Employer Sanctions, by
Alison M. Smith.  (Hereafter cited as CRS Report RS22180.)
148
 INA §274B, 8 U.S.C. §1324b.  These provisions will not be discussed further here.  See
CRS Report RS22180.  Additional information is also available at the OSC website
[http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/osc/index.html].
issue cited a lack of investigative resources as to why they could not respond in the
manner USCIS wanted.”145
The inter-agency coordination problems, coupled with the observable decline
in investigator work years allocated to document and benefit fraud, are more relevant
when considering the role bogus documents and benefit fraud play in facilitating
other violations of law.  Some maintain that limited enforcement resources should
not be spent going after purveyors who primarily are providing false identification
so that unauthorized aliens can work.  Others argue that it is critical to investigate the
black market in counterfeit documents and benefit fraud because it is especially
important to international terrorists, organized crime syndicates, and alien smuggling
rings — all of whom rely on fraudulent documents to minimize detection.
Worksite Enforcement
The INA prohibits the unlawful employment of aliens and related
discrimination.146  These prohibitions were added to the INA by the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).  The provisions on unlawful employment
sought to deter unauthorized immigration by reducing the magnet of employment.
These provisions, as amended, make it unlawful for an employer to knowingly hire,
or recruit or refer for a fee, or continue to employ an alien who is not authorized to
be so employed.  They require employers to verify the employment eligibility of new
hires by examining documents that establish identity and work eligibility, and to
complete and retain verification forms.  Employers violating these requirements may
be subject to civil and/or criminal penalties, known as employer sanctions.147  The
term employer sanctions is also used generally to refer to the provisions on unlawful
employment.  The ICE Office of Investigations has primary responsibility for
enforcing these provisions.  The related anti-discrimination provisions, as amended,
prohibit employment discrimination against U.S. citizens or work-authorized aliens
based on national origin or on citizenship or immigration status.  These provisions
are enforced by the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair
Employment Practices (OSC) in the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice.148
Full enforcement of the employer sanctions provisions began in June 1988 in
the nonagricultural sector and in December 1988 in agriculture.  Primary enforcement
responsibility at the time rested with the former INS as part of its investigations
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program.149  In the early years, educating employers about their responsibilities in
order to promote voluntary compliance continued to be a key focus of the program.
At the same time, an increasing emphasis was placed on enforcing penalties against
violators.  At that time, enforcement of employer sanctions combined “traditional
investigations — based on leads about suspected violations — with compliance
investigations based on neutral, or random, selection of employers.”150
Policy Changes.  Policies governing the enforcement of employer sanctions
have changed over the years.  On April 5, 1991, then-INS Commissioner Gene
McNary issued a memorandum ordering the Office of Enforcement and the Office
of the General Counsel to launch a six-month initiative to strengthen enforcement of
employer sanctions.151  An implementation plan accompanying the memorandum
stated:  “The message to employers must be unequivocal — INS is prepared to
vigorously enforce administrative and criminal sanctions against those who violate
the law.”  According to the implementation plan, INS investigators were to spend at
least 30 percent of their time for the remainder of FY1991 on each of three
investigations program priorities — employer sanctions, criminal aliens, and fraud.
New fraud cases were to focus predominantly on employer sanctions-related fraud.
In addition, INS worksite enforcement resources were to be directed toward
enforcement activities and not used for employer education.152  In January 1992, the
enhanced worksite enforcement initiative was extended indefinitely.
In February 1995, President Clinton issued a memorandum which identified
worksite enforcement and employer sanctions as a major component of the
Administration’s overall strategy to deter illegal immigration.  The Administration’s
approach was to “target enforcement efforts at employers and industries that
historically have relied upon employment of illegal immigrants.”153
For FY1996, the Clinton Administration requested, and Congress appropriated,
significant funding increases for interior enforcement, including worksite
enforcement and employment eligibility verification.  At that time, Congress also
enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), which established three pilot programs for employment eligibility
confirmation; reduced the number of acceptable documents for purposes of
completing employment eligibility verification forms, known as I-9 forms; and
provided employers with the possibility of a “good faith” defense against technical
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violations of I-9 requirements.154  During the 1995-1998 period, INS conducted
numerous onsite workplace raids and arrested thousands of unauthorized aliens.
In 1998,  INS changed its approach to worksite enforcement.155 Apparently, the
change was prompted largely by complaints about INS tactics during worksite raids.
The new procedures responded to complaints by Congress and others, and
incorporated the “best practices” of various offices.156  An INS memorandum at that
time noted that “worksite enforcement operations [actions by INS to arrest
unauthorized aliens at a worksite] are sometimes misunderstood by the general
public” leading to a lack of public support.157  Given that the “purpose of worksite
enforcement is to deter the unlawful employment of aliens... worksite enforcement
investigations that involve alien smuggling, human rights abuses, and other criminal
violations must take precedence.”158
As discussed above, in 1999, INS unveiled a new interior enforcement strategy,
which included five priorities, two of which related to worksite enforcement.  In a
prepared statement for a July 1999 hearing by the House Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, INS Executive Associate Commissioner
for Policy and Planning Robert Bach explained the relationship between these two
worksite enforcement priorities as follows:
INS believes there is a clear nexus between defeating smuggling organizations
 — which is Priority 2 — and blocking access to and removing undocumented
workers — Priority 5.  Disrupting and dismantling a smuggling organization that
transports undocumented workers across the U.S. border will have a direct
impact on limiting employers’ access to this exploitable source of labor.
Additionally, anti-smuggling efforts generate leads on employers and industries
employing undocumented workers.159
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According to Bach, the new interior enforcement strategy emphasized both working
cooperatively with employers to improve their compliance with employment
eligibility verification requirements and reduce unauthorized employment, as well as
prosecuting employers who violate the law.  He indicated that INS would focus on
criminal employer cases, cases in which there was a pattern or practice of knowingly
employing unauthorized workers, and would target, in particular, employers who
abused their workers and who violated multiple laws.160
Under the 1999 interior enforcement strategy, INS pursued the general tactical
approach of auditing I-9 forms to identify suspected unauthorized aliens.  It did so
on a large-scale basis in an operation targeting the meatpacking industry, called
“Operation Vanguard.”  Launched in the fall of 1998, Operation Vanguard involved
subpoenaing the I-9 forms and other employment records of workers in all the
meatpacking plants in Nebraska and in some plants in Iowa and South Dakota.  By
checking these records against INS, Social Security Administration, and other
databases, INS developed lists of employees whose work authorization it could not
verify.  These lists were then distributed to employers, who arranged interviews for
the workers with INS.
At the July 1999 House Immigration and Claims Subcommittee hearing, Mark
Reed, then director of the INS Central Region office, maintained that the Operation
Vanguard approach was more effective than the workplace raids and arrests of past
years:
If the numbers were smaller, if we had less people in the United States
unlawfully, if we had less employers engaging in this, doing raids and removing
people would be a much more effective strategy, but we simply can’t do that.161
Operation Vanguard prompted a strong political backlash, however, and was
ended.  Testifying at a May 2005 joint hearing by the Senate Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittees on Immigration, Border Security, and Citizenship and Terrorism,
Technology, and Homeland Security, Reed, now with a consulting firm, offered his
retrospective views on Operation Vanguard:
Vanguard demonstrated an efficient and effective capability to bar unauthorized
workers from employment in any given sector.  When the capability was
realized, it was stopped as well.  In reality, the implementation of Vanguard was
not good government.... Depriving these [meatpacking] plants the ability to
remain competitive was a major threat to the livelihood of everyone in the
community.
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, interior enforcement
resources were redirected from traditional program areas, including worksite
enforcement, to national security-related investigations.  While criminal employer
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cases remained a stated priority of the worksite enforcement program, they became
subordinate to “removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure facilities
such as airports, military bases, research facilities, nuclear plants, etc.”162  A 2003
memorandum issued by ICE headquarters suggests the extent of the post-9/11
emphasis on critical infrastructure investigations.  The memorandum requires field
offices to request headquarters approval before opening a worksite enforcement
investigation not related to critical infrastructure protection.163
Coordination with Department of Labor.  While ICE has primary
responsibility for enforcing INA provisions on the unlawful employment of aliens,
the Department of Labor (DOL) also has a role.  The INA requires that employers
retain completed I-9 employment eligibility verification forms and make them
available for inspection by DOL.  In addition to this statutory role, it is widely
believed that DOL, specifically the Employment Standards Administration (ESA),
can help reduce unauthorized employment by carrying out its core responsibilities to
enforce labor standards.  Enforcing labor standards can help deter unauthorized
employment, it is argued, by depriving employers of some of the potential financial
advantages of employing unauthorized workers at substandard wages and working
conditions.
In 1992, INS and DOL’s ESA entered into a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) to improve cooperation and coordination between the agencies.164  Under the
terms of the 1992 MOU, ESA was given authority to issue warning notices to
employers for violations of the employment eligibility verification requirements.
ESA also was to promptly refer suspected substantive violations to INS.  At the same
time, the MOU stated that ESA,  would not take any action which would compromise
its ability to carry out its fundamental mission [of enforcing labor standards statutes],
regardless of the workers’ immigration status.  DOL officials took the position that
investigating worksite immigration matters, beyond reviewing I-9 forms, could
impede their efforts to enforce worker protection laws.165  Thus, ESA’s role was
limited mainly to reviewing employers’ I-9 forms and reporting results to INS.
ESA and INS signed a new MOU in 1998 that sought to address DOL’s
concerns about conducting worksite immigration enforcement and to clarify the
CRS-41
166
 U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, and U.S. Department
of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Memorandum of Understanding
Between the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, and the
Employment Standards Administration, Department of Labor, Nov. 23, 1998.  Available in
Interpreter Releases, vol. 75, no. 47 (Dec. 14, 1998), pp. 1711-1721. 
167
 Employers have 30 days to request a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge in
DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) to contest a NIF .  If no hearing is
requested, ICE issues a Final Order for civil money penalties.  If a hearing is requested, the
process may end in a Final Order, a settlement, or a dismissal.
168
 For information on current penalties, see CRS Report RS22180, Unauthorized
Employment of Aliens: Basics of Employer Sanctions, by Alison M. Smith.
enforcement roles and responsibilities of each agency.166  Under the 1998 MOU, ESA
investigators are to inspect employer compliance with I-9 requirements in
conjunction with labor standards enforcement only in directed investigations, that is,
investigations not based on complaints.  According to the MOU, this limitation “is
intended and will be implemented so as to avoid discouraging complaints from
unauthorized workers who may be victims of labor standards violations by their
employer.”  During these compliance inspections, ESA investigators are not to make
inquiries about workers’ immigration status and are not to issue warning notices or
Notices of Intent to Fine.  ESA is to promptly refer to INS all suspected serious
violations uncovered during directed investigations.  While this MOU remains in
effect, it is of less relevance at the present time in light of ICE’s current worksite
enforcement focus on critical infrastructure facilities.
Program Performance.  As discussed above, employers who violate INA
provisions on the unlawful employment of aliens may be subject to civil and/or
criminal penalties.  For violations of I-9 paperwork requirements or of the prohibition
against knowingly hiring or continuing to employ aliens who lack employment
authorization, employers may be subject to fines.  If ICE believes that an employer
has committed a violation of these provisions, the agency may issue the employer a
Notice of Intent to Fine (NIF).  A NIF may result in a Final Order for civil money
penalties, a settlement, or a dismissal.167  Employers convicted of having engaged in
a pattern or practice of knowingly hiring or continuing to employ unauthorized aliens
may face fines and/or imprisonment.168
Table 1. Worksite Enforcement Program Performance: 
FY1999-FY2003
Fiscal Year FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003
Criminal Employer
Cases Presented for
Prosecution
182 109 239 21 4
Notices of Intent to
Fine (NIFs) Issued 443 213 141 73 16
Fine Amounts
Collected $3,690,575 $2,234,181 $1,599,323 $509,835 $212,322
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Table 1 provides data on worksite enforcement program performance for
FY1999 through FY2003.169  As shown, the number of NIFs issued and the amount
of fine collections decreased steadily during this period.  Policy changes and
reallocations of resources can help explain these trends.  As discussed above, INS’s
1999 interior enforcement strategy de-emphasized non-criminal employer cases,
which can generate administrative fines, in favor of criminal cases.  In accordance
with this strategy, “criminal employer cases presented for prosecution” became the
only worksite enforcement program production quota assigned to INS field offices
in FY1999. 170
In light of the priority given to criminal prosecutions, however, the significant
decrease from FY1999 to FY2000 in this measure is puzzling.  The decreases in the
three measures between FY2001 and FY2002 presumably reflect, at least in part, the
post-September 11, 2001 redirection of enforcement resources toward national
security-related investigations.  Underreporting may also have contributed to these
decreases, especially the sharp drops in “criminal cases presented for prosecution.”
According to ICE, data for FY2002 and FY2003 may understate actual activity.
While the availability of resources and policy shifts help explain changes in
worksite enforcement program performance over time, the program also faces more
perennial challenges that impact performance.  Among these challenges are the
applicable legal standards for sanctioning employers and the prevalence of fraudulent
documents.  INA §274A makes it unlawful for employers to knowingly hire or
continue to employ unauthorized aliens.  Under the law, an employer is required to
attest that he or she has verified that an employee is not unauthorized to work by
examining documentation provided by the employee.  An employer is considered to
be in compliance with this examination requirement “if the document reasonably
appears on its face to be genuine.”  INA §274A also provides that an employer who
establishes that he or she has complied in good faith with the I-9 requirements has
an affirmative defense against the charge of knowingly hiring an unauthorized alien.
The widespread availability and use of fraudulent documents171 makes it difficult to
prove that an employer knowingly hired an unauthorized alien and, thus, should be
subject to penalties.  With respect to sanctions for violations of the I-9 requirements,
a 1996 amendment to INA §274A  provides employers with the possibility of a good
faith defense against technical or procedural violations.
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Current Policy Issues and Options.  Worksite enforcement is a current
focus of congressional interest.  Among the reasons for this is the large and growing
unauthorized alien population, the majority of whom are in the labor force.
According to estimates by the Pew Hispanic Center, in 2004 the unauthorized alien
population totaled about 10.3 million and the unauthorized alien working population
totaled about 6.3 million.172  Particularly since the 2001 terrorist attacks, security
concerns have been raised about having such a large unauthorized population.
In addition, the issue of worksite enforcement has gained attention recently in
connection with guest worker proposals.  In January 2004, President Bush outlined
a proposal for a new temporary worker program, and called for increased workplace
enforcement as part of the program.173  As Congress turns its attention to worksite
enforcement, there are several key policy issues it may opt to consider:
Resources. Historically, as discussed above, investigative time devoted to
employer cases has been limited.  In the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks,
resources available for worksite enforcement further dwindled, as interior
enforcement increasingly focused on national security investigations.  Policy
questions include whether additional personnel or other resources would improve the
performance of the worksite enforcement program and whether such resources should
be provided.
Employment Eligibility Verification.  Related to worksite enforcement and
its goal of reducing unauthorized employment is the process of employment
eligibility verification.  Under the mandatory I-9 system, employers examine
documents to verify a new hire’s identity and work authorization, and employers and
employees complete I-9 forms.  There is broad agreement that the widespread
availability and use of fraudulent documents has largely undermined the I-9 system.
Another available mechanism for employment eligibility verification is the Basic
Pilot program, in which participating employers electronically verify new hires’ I-9
information through Social Security Administration and CIS databases to determine
whether individuals are authorized to work.  The Basic Pilot program is now
available nationwide and participation is, for the most part, voluntary.174  Policy
questions include whether to revise or replace the current verification systems.
Options under discussion include making the Basic Pilot program mandatory for
some subset of, or all, employers, and requiring job seekers to have some type of
tamper-proof work authorization document.  These and other options may, in turn,
raise concerns about privacy and discrimination.
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Employer Sanctions.  Another policy question concerns whether the current
penalties for employers who violate the law on the unlawful employment of aliens
should be changed.  Some have argued that employer sanctions and the prohibition
against hiring unauthorized aliens should be repealed entirely, on the grounds that
they have not succeeded in curbing unauthorized employment and have had other
negative effects, such as lowering wages and undercutting efforts to improve working
conditions.  Others have argued, alternatively, that existing penalties should be raised
and vigorously enforced to increase their deterrent effect.
Some have argued that worksite enforcement has never been truly implemented
as employer sanctions were never systematically enforced.  The former INS
conducted few inspections and they were generally performed randomly instead of
targeting industries that were most likely to hire unauthorized aliens.175
Role of Other Federal Agencies in Worksite Enforcement.  There are
other federal agencies which could play a larger role in aiding DHS’s worksite
enforcement efforts. The most obvious agencies who could aid in worksite
enforcement are the Department of Labor (DOL), since many argue that those who
commit wage and hour violations are also likely to use unauthorized alien labor, and
Social Security Administration (SSA), since the agency can detect possible
fraudulent uses of social security numbers (SSN’s). However, increasing the
immigration enforcement role of other federal agencies is controversial and could
distract the agencies from their primary missions.  GAO has testified that
coordination between the INS and with other federal agencies was sometimes
problematic, noting that the Department of Labor (DOL) was hesitant to delve into
work authorization issues as it might cause workers to fail to report potential wage
and safety violations.176
In addition, recently ICE has been criticized for impersonating other federal
agencies to locate unauthorized aliens.  For example, in 2005, ICE agents conducted
an operation by pretending to be from the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), and tricking workers into attending a “mandatory training
session.”  The operation was successful, leading to the arrest of 48 unauthorized
workers, but was also criticized by the DOL, local officials, and immigration and job
safety advocates, who argued that the operation could cause immigrant workers to
distrust safety officials responsible for protecting the workers by reducing injury
rates.177
Department of Labor.  Discussing the MOU at the July 1999 House hearing,
John Fraser, then Deputy Administrator of ESA’s Wage and Hour Division,
described “the fundamental dilemma of worksite enforcement” for DOL:
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DOL needs the cooperation of workers, including undocumented workers, to
report on labor standards violations or provide information needed to develop
enforcement cases.  Unfortunately, many vulnerable low-wage workers — the
primary focus of DOL labor standards enforcement — are often much less
willing to report workplace exploitation or cooperate in DOL investigations
when they perceive that doing so threatens their continued employment either
because of retaliation by their employer or because contact with DOL could
trigger an INS action to deport them, their family or their friends.178
As discussed above, in 1998 and 1999, the INS experimented with alternative
raids called Operation Vanguard, using SSA’s work records to identify unauthorized
aliens rather than conducting worksite raids.  Operation Vangaurd did not result in
many deportations, but may have worked as a deterrent, reducing the desirability of
the meat packing industry to unauthorized aliens.  Nonetheless, Operation Vangaurd
was criticized by workers, farmers, and industry leaders for violating workers’
privacy rights and targeting Hispanics.  In 1999, SSA stopped allowing INS to check
employee records against their database, citing privacy concerns, unless INS has
“reasonable cause to believe that a worker is unauthorized.179
Mark Krikorian, Executive Director of the Center of Immigration Studies,
testified that in the late 1990's the INS received criticism for worksite enforcement
in Nebraska’s meat packing plants and Georgia’s onion fields. As a result, it
developed a new interior enforcement strategy which focused entirely on criminal
aliens and smugglers.180
Social Security Administration (SSA).  SSA has data which could be used to
aid DHS in the identification of unauthorized alien workers. For example, SSA
maintains a Nonwork Alien File which contains social security numbers (SSNs)
issued to aliens without work authorization.  Earnings posted to numbers in the
Nonwork Alien File might indicate that an alien is working without authorization.
However, the alien may have received work authorization after the nonwork SSN
was issued.  DHS has said that the agency would have to invest significant resources
to determine whether the alien is working without authorization, and that this use of
resources may not be cost effective and would pull resources from other national
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security-related initiatives.  In addition, neither SSA nor DHS can easily update work
status, since their records lack a common identifier.181
In addition to data issues, there may be public resistance to SSA increasing their
role in the enforcement of immigration laws.  For example, in 2002, a policy change
at SSA that substantially increased the number of “no-match” letters sent to
employers received much attention due to its impact on unauthorized aliens.  No-
match letters are sent to employers to inform them of a discrepancy between a W-2
form and SSA’s records, so that workers can be properly credited with their earnings,
and to combat identity fraud.  Importantly, receipt of a no-match letter does not imply
that the employee is using a fraudulent SSN; the discrepancy could be the result of
a clerical error.  For tax years 1993 through 2000, an employer only received no-
match letters if 10 or more employees had discrepancies and the number of
employees with mismatches equaled at least 10% of the employer’s workforce.182
For the 2001 tax year, SSA implemented a new policy of sending no-match
letters to every employer with at least one employee with discrepancies on his or her
W-2.  For tax year 2000, SSA sent out approximately 110,000 no-match letters183
compared to approximately 950,000 for tax year 2001. However, the result was an
increase in complaints from employers who did not understand the purpose of the no-
match letter.  In addition, immigration advocates contend that tens of thousands of
aliens left their jobs or were fired as a result of the letters.184  Due to the controversy,
SSA again changed their policy, sending out approximately 110,000 no-match letters
for tax year 2002.185
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Immigration Enforcement at Ports of Entry: Immigration
Inspections186
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requires the inspection of all aliens
who seek entry into the United States187 and in some cases at a preinspection site in
a foreign country.188  The purpose of the inspection is to determine the admissibility
of a traveler to the United States.  Section 287 of the INA enumerates the following
authorities for immigration officers, including immigration inspectors:
! to question under oath any person seeking to enter the United States
in order to determine admissibility, and
! to search, without warrant, the person and belongings of any
applicant seeking admission.189
The majority of immigration inspections take place during the primary
inspections process.  Primary inspections is the first level of inspection, which
consists of a brief interview with an inspector, a cursory check of the traveler’s
documents, and a query of the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS).  Primary
inspections are quick (usually lasting no longer than a minute), however, if the
inspector is suspicious that the traveler may be in violation of the INA or other U.S.
laws, the traveler is referred to a secondary inspection.
During secondary inspections, aliens are questioned extensively and travel
documents are further examined.  Several immigration databases are queried as well,
including lookout databases.190  The majority of travelers, however, are not subject
to a secondary inspection.
In addition to conducting inspections, immigration inspectors enforce various
criminal and immigration statutes.  For example, immigration inspectors are on the
front line with respect to intercepting fraudulent documents used by aliens as well as
intercepting aliens, drugs, weapons and explosives that are smuggled into the United
States.  Immigration inspectors also encounter criminal aliens who attempt to gain
entry into the United States.  While immigration inspectors may encounter
enforcement-related issues during primary inspections, it is during secondary
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inspections that immigration inspectors conduct enforcement-related activities.  In
FY2003, immigration inspectors spent 13% of their time on enforcement-related
activities.191  Over the most recent four years for which data are available, the time
spent by immigration inspectors on enforcement activities has steadily risen, with the
exception of FY2001 when it dropped 3% from FY2000 (see Figure 9 and Table
2).
Table 2.  Percentage of Inspector Hours Spent on Primary and
Secondary Inspections and Enforcement Activities: 
FY1992-FY2003
Primary Secondary Enforce Primary Secondary Enforce
1992 69.20% 28.6% 2.1% 1998 62.2% 30.9% 6.8%
1993 69% 28.9% 2.1% 1999 63.4% 29.5% 7.1%
1994 68.4% 29.5% 2.1% 2000 63.4% 27.4% 9.2%
1995 65.3% 29.2% 5.5% 2001 69.8% 24.1% 6.1%
1996 65.4% 30.4% 4.2% 2002 68.2% 20.8% 11%
1997 63.2% 31.5% 5.3% 2003 65.3% 21.8% 12.9%
Source:  CRS Analysis of data from DHS’s Performance Analysis System (PAS).
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Immigration inspectors generate cases that are referred to ICE’s investigative
unit for investigation and prosecution.192  An analysis of the data shows that the
number of cases that were referred to investigations during the period that was
analyzed peaked in 2002, at 1,782 cases (see Table 3).  In FY2003, the number of
cases referred to investigations dropped 42% from FY2002, to 1,028 cases.
Table 3.  Immigration Inspections:  Cases Referred to
Investigations for Prosecution and Interception of Smuggled
Aliens, Narcotics, and Contraband:  FY2000-FY2003
Year Cases referred
Intercepted
Aliens
Intercepted
narcotics
Intercepted
contraband
2000 636 19,857 3,764 N.A.
2001 1,676 31,261 4,892 320
2002 1,782 32,173 3,913 945
2003 1,028 34,473 1,988 1,359
Source:  CRS analysis of PAS data.
Note:  Contraband includes weapons and explosives.  Data on contraband not available for FY2002.
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Primary Inspections Secondary Inspections Enforcement Activities
Total Workyears 2,272.9 2,331.3 2,446.1 2,244.9 2,348.9 2,664.9 2,795.9 3,173.7 3,188.6 2,683.5 2,871.6 2,098
Primary Inspections 1,574 1,608.4 1,672.5 1,465 1,536.2 1,684.8 1,740 2,013 2,021.8 1,873.3 1,959.8 1,370.5
Secondary Inspections 650.4 673.7 722.6 656.6 713.8 839.2 865 936.1 872.5 645.7 596 456.8
Enforcement Activities 48.5 49.3 51 123.3 98.9 140.9 190.9 224.6 294.3 164.5 315.8 270.7
Figure 9.  Inspector Workyears by Type:  FY1992-FY2003
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have come into contact with the law enforcement community.  Fingerprint information is
submitted to the FBI by participating federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.
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 CBP’s Passenger Analysis Unit is an automated targeting system, located at ports of
entry, that is based on strategic intelligence about threats.  This system identifies individuals
who may need to be more closely scrutinized. 
Interception of Smuggled Goods.  Immigration inspectors play a key role
in intercepting the smuggling of humans, narcotics and contraband.  The interception
of aliens that are smuggled into the United States led all other types of smuggling at
U.S. ports of entry for the years that were analyzed by CRS.  During the four years
that were analyzed by CRS, immigration inspectors intercepted more aliens and
narcotics being smuggled into the country each year after FY2000 (see Table 2).
Databases.  Immigration inspectors use several systems and databases to
assist them with identifying aliens who are potentially inadmissible under the INA
or otherwise may pose a threat to the country.  In particular, four systems are
commonly used to screen out individuals:
! Interagency Border Inspections System (IBIS),193
! Automated Biometrics Identification System (IDENT),194
! National Crime Information System (NCIC III),195 and
! Passenger Analysis Unit System.196
In FY2003, these systems intercepted over 207,000 aliens.  In FY2002, over 254,000
aliens were intercepted, an increase of over 66,000 from FY2001.
Selected Immigration Inspections Issues.  Since the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks, considerable concern has been raised because the 19 terrorists
were aliens who apparently entered the United States on temporary visas.  Although
the INA bars terrorists, consular officers issuing the visas and immigration inspectors
working at the borders did not have access to all the law enforcement and
intelligence data that might identify potential terrorists.  Congress has enacted major
laws requiring information sharing and interoperable databases to screen potential
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terrorists and criminal aliens, the most recent being the REAL ID Act of 2005.197
Whether these provisions are being successfully implemented remains an important
policy question.198
Screening Aliens and Implementation of the US-VISIT Program.
While the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)
program — the automated entry and exit data system that is present at various ports
of entry — has been heralded as a tool to enhance border security, critics question
whether it will effectively track the entry-exit of suspicious foreign nationals.199
Some have expressed concern that most Canadians and the 6.4 million Mexicans
with border crossing cards are not subjected to the requirements of the US-VISIT
program,200 thus establishing a variety of avenues for potential terrorists and
criminals to elude detection through US-VISIT’s biometric background checks.
While almost all observers agree that the implementation of US-VISIT has
proven to be challenging, especially at land ports of entry, many express confidence
that it will ultimately be successful.  Administration officials cite the number of
aliens apprehended or denied entry as the result of the various systems and databases
that comprise US-VISIT as evidence that US-VISIT can achieve its objectives.  In
2004, the Administration reported that 100 aliens had “hits” in US-VISIT.201
Currently, the US-VISIT program is being implemented at land POEs and
therefore only includes a fraction of the total traveling public.  According to a DHS
Office of Inspector General report published in February 2005, only 2.7% of the
traveling public are vetted. The remaining 97.3% are currently exempt from the
requirements of the program. To put this in context, of the 97.3% that are not
screened through US-VISIT, the plurality (34%) are citizens of the United States,
roughly 29% comprise of Mexicans who possess a Laser Visa and 15% are visa-
exempt Canadians. Another major category is comprised of Legal Permanent
Residents of the United States (which make up 21% of the entering population).
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DHS’ OIG expressed concern about the number of travelers who are currently
exempt from the requirements of the program, including Mexican nationals in
possession of a BCC (unless traveling beyond the border zone), and visa-exempt
Canadian nationals. Visa-exempt Canadian nationals are exempt from the current
travel document requirements,202 at least until the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative is implemented,203 Mexican nationals in possession of a Laser Visa are also
exempt from such requirements.204
Biometric Verification System (BVS).  Mexican nationals who plan to stay
in the United States for a specified period of time, travel within a certain
geographical distance from the border and posseses a Laser Visa are exempt from the
requirements of the US-VISIT program.  The Administration exempted this category
of individuals primarily due to the extensive background check that includes the
querying of several criminal and watchlisting databases that is conducted on all Laser
Visa applicants.  The Administration also contends that the Laser Visa document is
read and scanned at the time the Mexican national presents himself for entry to the
U.S. at a POE, thus providing an extra layer of security.  Observers note, however,
that the equipment necessary to read and scan the documents are not at every POE.
At POEs where the equipment is being piloted, the equipment is reportedly in the
secondary inspections area and does not operate 100% of the time.  Moreover, the
BVS is not integrated with other critical data systems and databases.
Enforcement Between Ports of Entry205
The law prohibits aliens from entering or attempting to enter the United States
at any time or place which has not been designated by an immigration officer (i.e.,
a port of entry).  It also prohibits any alien from eluding inspection by immigration
officers.206  The United States Border Patrol (USBP) is tasked with detecting and
preventing the entrance of aliens trying to evade inspection by crossing into the
United States between ports of entry (POEs). USB’s primary mission is to detect and
prevent the entry of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and unauthorized aliens
from coming into the country, and to interdict drug smugglers and other criminals
between official ports of entry.
The USBP patrols 8,000 miles of the international borders with Mexico and
Canada and the coastal waters around Florida and Puerto Rico.207  The Southwestern
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border accounts for over 97% of all illegal alien apprehensions and as a result of this
commands the lion’s share of USBP resources and manpower.  The Northern border,
conversely, poses a severe logistical challenge given its length, geography, and
comparative lack of manpower.
About 90% of USBP agents are deployed along the Southwest border with
Mexico.  This deployment reflects the USBP’s decade long policy of “Prevention
Through Deterrence,” which aims to place enough agents and resources directly on
the border to deter would-be border crossers and reroute illegal border traffic from
traditional urban routes to less populated and geographically harsher areas, providing
USBP agents with a tactical advantage over illegal border crossers and smugglers.208
It also reflects the operational reality that the vast majority of unauthorized migration
into the U.S. originates in Mexico.
Shortly after the creation of DHS, the USBP was directed to formulate a new
Border Patrol National Strategy that would better reflect the realities of the post 9/11
security landscape. In March of 2005, the USBP unveiled the new strategy, which
places greater emphasis on interdicting terrorists and features five main objectives:
! establishing the substantial probability of apprehending terrorists and
their weapons as they attempt to enter illegally between the ports of
entry;
! deterring illegal entries through improved enforcement;
! detecting, apprehending, and deterring smugglers of humans, drugs,
and other contraband; 
! leveraging “Smart Border” technology to multiply the deterrent and
enforcement effect of agents; and
! reducing crime in border communities, thereby improving the
quality of life and economic vitality of those areas.209
In the national strategy, DHS notes that while many classify aliens attempting
to enter the country illegally between POE as “economic migrants,” an “ever present
threat exists from the potential for terrorists to employ the same smuggling and
transportation networks, infrastructure, drop houses, and other support then use these
masses of illegal aliens as ‘cover’ for a successful cross-border penetration.”210  In an
attempt to address this threat, the USBP’s new strategy focuses on laying the
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 Apprehensions have long been used as a performance measure by the USBP.  However,
it is impossible to gauge solely from apprehensions data whether increases or decreases in
apprehensions are due to unauthorized migration patterns or border enforcement policies
and resources.  An increase in apprehensions could be due to an increase in the number of
unauthorized migrants attempting to enter the country.  The same increase could also be due
to increased patrolling of the border, as the additional agents make more arrests.  Or it could
be due to both an increase in the number of people attempting to illegally enter the country
and increased patrolling.  Lastly, it could be due to neither, and merely be a statistical
anomaly. 
foundation for achieving operational control over the border.  The USBP defines
operational control as “the ability to detect, respond to, and interdict border
penetrations in areas deemed as high priority for threat potential or other national
security objectives.”211  The strategy places greater emphasis on a hierarchical and
vertical command structure, featuring a direct chain of command from headquarters
to the field.
The strategy also builds on the “Prevention Through Deterrence” strategy
outlined in the agency’s previous National Strategic Plan by placing added emphasis
on enhancing its ability to rapidly deploy agents in response to emerging threats.
Tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence is critical to this new emphasis on
rapid deployment, as it will allow the USBP to assess risks and target its enforcement
efforts to best address those risks.  According to the strategy, much of this
intelligence will be generated through the use of next generation surveillance
systems, including cameras, sensors, and other technologies.  Additionally, the USBP
will coordinate closely with CBP’s Office of Intelligence and other DHS and Federal
agencies’ intelligence apparatuses.  Lastly, the new USBP National Strategy
formulates different strategies tailored to each of the agency’s three operational
theaters: the Southwest border, the Northern border, and the coastal waters around
Florida and Puerto Rico.
Apprehensions.212  The impact of the “Prevention Through Deterrence”
strategy has been difficult to gauge. There is considerable evidence that it has made
border crossing more challenging, expensive, and dangerous for illegal aliens.
However, the total number of aliens apprehended increased steadily from 1994 to
2000 as the number of personnel and resources deployed along the border more than
doubled. It is possible that the increased presence of agents and resources stationed
on the border led the INS to catch more unauthorized aliens, accounting for the
increase in apprehensions. It is also possible that the increase in apprehensions during
that period instead reflects an increase in the number of people trying to enter the
country in order to benefit from the quickly growing economy of the mid to late
1990s.
Figure 10 shows the recent trends in USBP apprehensions along the border.
USBP apprehensions increased steadily through the late 1990s, reaching a peak of
1.68 million in 2000. From 2000 to 2003 apprehensions have declined steadily,
reaching a low of 931,557 in 2003. This reduction could be attributed to the
“Prevention Through Deterrence” strategy finally reaching a critical mass of enough
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agents and resources placed directly on the border to severely inhibit illegal migrants
from entering the country. Conversely, the reduction may be the result of fewer
unauthorized aliens trying to enter the country due to the economic recession and
rising unemployment during this period that made finding low paying jobs
increasingly difficult for illegal aliens. In addition, the reduction could be an
indication that increasing staffing does not increase the USBP’s effectiveness.  In
FY2004, apprehensions increased by 25% to 1.16 million; apprehensions remained
relatively stable in FY2005, increasing slightly to 1.2 million.
Source:  CRS presentation of data from: for 1997, Immigration and Naturalization Service, FY1997
Statistical Yearbook of the INS.  For FY1998-FY2004, DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, FY2004
Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, January 2006.  FY2005, DHS, FY2005 Monthly Statistical Report,
Year End, September 2005.
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Figure 10.  Border Patrol Apprehensions:  FY1997-FY2005
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Enforcement of Immigration Laws and Local Law
Enforcement213
DHS has a limited number of interior investigators who are charged with
enforcing immigration, customs, and other federal law within the interior of the
country, compared to over 600,000 state and local law enforcement officers.214  In an
effort to carry out the country’s anti-terrorism mission and strengthen the interior
enforcement of immigration law, DHS has entered into agreements (Memoranda of
Understanding) with several localities that include the deputizing of local law
enforcement officers to assist the federal government with enforcing certain aspects
of immigration law.215
The origins of these agreements date back to 1996.  The Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 amended the INA by permitting
the Attorney General to enter into written agreements with states and localities to
allow law enforcement personnel to perform certain immigration functions relating
to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens so long as it is consistent
with state and local law.  The law required that law enforcement personnel
performing such functions have knowledge of relevant federal laws and receive
adequate training to perform the functions.
Proponents of these agreements argue that the initiative would assist DHS to
enforce the immigration law further into the interior of the United States.216  Also,
they assert that the initiative would make it easier to arrest more potential terrorists
and foreign born criminals, thus providing an elevated level of security for the
nation.217
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Opponents contend, however, that these agreements undermine the relationship
between local law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve,218 noting
that there are existing tensions between local law enforcement agencies and many
minority communities, and this tension is heightened when local law enforcement
engages in immigration enforcement.219  For example, potential witnesses and victims
of crime may be reluctant to come forward to report crimes in fear of actions that
might be taken against them by DHS.  They contend that the initiative could result
in the reduction of local law enforcement resources as well as the inconsistent
application of immigration law across jurisdictions.220  Some law enforcement
officers have raised concerns about the complexities of immigration law creating
liability issues.221
Resource Allocation
Previously in this report, workload measures were presented for the different
types of immigration enforcement activities.  For example, for removals, workload
was measured in the number of removals, for worksite enforcement in NIFs, for
inspectors, the number of inspections.  Nonetheless, none of these measures are
comparable with each other.  For example,  comparing the number of inspections
with the number of removals does not provide any insight into resource allocation,
especially since the staff time devoted to each task is different.  It may take three
minutes of an inspectors time to process an alien entering the country, where as it
may take days or weeks for a special agent to locate and apprehend one illegal alien.
This section examines the actual hours spent on different tasks by Special
Agents and Immigration Agents from 1992 through 2003.  As previously discussed,
during 2004, ICE and CBP switched their accounting system from INS’ Performance
Analysis System (PAS) to the U.S. Customs Service’s Treasury Enforcement
Communications System (TECS), and as a result, data for 2004 onward are not
comparable with previous years.  TECS contains fewer data fields than PAS, which
means that some of the data in PAS do not exist in TECS.  In addition, the data for
FY2004 are incomplete in both systems, as the different parts of ICE did not switch
from PAS to TECS at the same time.
CRS-58
222
 A workyear is equal to 2,080 hours of work and represents the work performed by one
full-time investigator in a year.
Interior Enforcement Hours
As discussed above, activities typically label as interior enforcement include the
detention and removal of aliens who entered illegally or violated the terms of their
admittance, alien smuggling and trafficking investigations, worksite enforcement,
and investigations of benefit and document fraud.
Overview.  Figure 11 shows that, of the years examined, the number of hours
devoted to “interior” enforcement activities was lowest in FY1992 (1,375
workyears).222  The number of workyears increased slightly between FY1992 and
FY1994, and then decreased in FY1995 (1,393 workyears).  Between FY1995 and
FY1999, the number of workyears increased.  Of the years analyzed, the number of
workyears reached a peak of 2,081 in FY1999 (the same year that INS released its
interior enforcement strategy), declined until FY2002 (1,806), and then increased in
FY2003 (1,892).
Source:  CRS analysis of data from DHS’ Performance Analysis System (PAS).
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Frauds 210.4 199.2 216.1 181.4 140.2 146.9 177.7 194.7 180.8 151.3 110.9 146.1
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EWI/Status Violators 45.7 52.1 56.5 57.1 68.5 91.6 98.4 100.5 124.3 111.5 115.6 125.8
Admin/Non-Investigative 204.8 239.8 212.9 228.2 345.6 404.5 477.4 437.5 442.4 397.7 398.6 434.9
Misc. 5.5 4.8 3.7 6.7 14 10.9 13.4 10.7 10.7 9.7 62.1 100.6
Total 1,374.1 1,451.4 1,469 1,393.2 1,561.5 1,831.6 2,056.8 2,081 2,005.7 1,851.1 1,806 1,892.1
Figure 11.  Workyears Devoted to Interior Immigration Enforcement 
Activities by Type:  FY1992-FY2003
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 DHS, An Assessment of the Proposal to Merge Customs and Border Protection with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, p. 1.
Between FY1992 and FY2003, the largest number of workyears were devoted
to locating and arresting criminal aliens, approximately one-third of all the workyears
(see Figure 12).  The proportion of workyears related to worksite enforcement has
decreased, though not consistently, since FY1992.  In FY1992, worksite enforcement
accounted for 18.1% of all workyears, whereas in FY2003, worksite enforcement
only comprised 3.5% of all workyears.  Similarly, the percentage of workyears
devoted to fraud investigations was larger in FY1992 (15.3%) than in FY2003
(7.7%).  Conversely, the proportion  of total hours devoted to status violations and
non-investigative work were larger in FY2003 than in FY1992.  The percentage of
time devoted to smuggling remained relatively stable compared to the trends in the
other types of investigations.  Notably, in FY2004 and FY2005, ICE suffered funding
shortfalls, resulting in training, travel, recruitment, pay, and awards shortages, and
as a result it is unlikely that ICE was able to devote additional resources to
immigration enforcement during those years.223
Source:  CRS analysis of data from DHS’ Performance Analysis System (PAS).
Criminal.  Historically, the largest proportion of work hours have been devoted
to criminal alien cases (see Figures 11 and 12).  In FY1992, 433 workyears were
spent locating and arresting criminal aliens.  That number increased in FY1993 and
FY1994 (550), and then decreased in FY1995 (498).  Between FY1997 and FY1999,
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Figure 12.  Percent of Workyears by Enforcement Activity:  
FY1992-FY2003
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the number of hours devoted to criminal aliens increased, and peaked in FY1999 at
811 workyears.  The number of hours devoted to these cases decreased between
FY1999 and FY2003.  In FY2003, the number of workyears devoted to criminal alien
cases was 740, almost double the amount of hours spent on these cases in FY1992.
In addition, the increase in actual hours does not correspond to a doubling of the
proportion of time spent on criminal alien cases.  In FY1992, 31.5% of all hours were
spent on criminal alien cases.  The proportion of time increased to 37.5% in FY1994,
and decreased to 33.4% in FY1997.  Between FY1997 and FY2002, the percentage
of time devoted to criminal alien cases rose to 41.6% and then decreased to 39.1%
in FY2003.
Source:  CRS analysis of data from DHS’ Performance Analysis System (PAS), and FY1992-1997
from Immigration and Naturalization Service, FY1997 Statistical Yearbook of the INS.
FY1998-FY2004 from DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, FY2004 Yearbook of Immigration
Statistics, January 2006, p. 162.  FY2005, DHS, FY2005 Monthly Statistical Report, Year End,
September 2005.
Figure 13 shows that the number of workyears devoted to criminal aliens and
the number of criminal alien removals are highly correlated.  As the number of
workyears devoted to criminal aliens increased, so did the number of aliens removed
on criminal grounds.  However, from FY2002 to FY2003, the number of hours
decreased slightly while the number of criminal removals increased, which may be
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Figure 13.  Workyears Spent on Criminal Aliens, and Number 
of Criminal Alien Removals:  FY1992-FY2003
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 As explained by former DHS Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security
Asa Hutchinson in written response to questions from the Senate Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship, resources from worksite
enforcement and other enforcement activities were diverted in the 1990s to locate and
remove criminal aliens.
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Directive for Worksite Enforcement Operations,” memorandum, May 22, 1998.  The
memorandum and attachments are reprinted in Interpreter Releases, vol. 75, no. 27 (July 17,
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related to the drop in criminal removals in FY2002.  Based on this analysis, one
could argue that an increase in resources for criminal alien investigations would
result in an increase in removals of criminal aliens.  Nonetheless, there may be a limit
to the effect that addition of resources will have on criminal alien investigations. For
example, an increase in the number of criminal alien arrests would increase the
workload of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). Thus, if ICE
significantly increases their arrests of criminal aliens, the removal cases will still
have to be adjudicated by EOIR before the alien can be removed.  In addition, since
criminal aliens are subject to mandatory detention, increasing the arrests of criminal
aliens will increase the need for detention bedspace.
Worksite Enforcement.  An analysis of INS investigation workload data
reveals that time spent on employer cases by agents, supervisors, and non-clerical
support personnel accounted for less than 18% of total investigation workyears in
each year from FY1992 through FY2003 (See Figures 11 and 12).  One factor
routinely cited to explain why a greater share of interior enforcement resources was
not available for employer cases is the growth of the criminal alien workload in the
1990s.224  According to Under Secretary Hutchinson, the criminal alien workload
“eventually grew to the point that it consumed more investigative hours than any
other enforcement activity.”225
Figures 11 and 12 reflect a series of changes to the worksite enforcement
program that occurred over the FY1992-FY2003 period.  During the first half of this
period, as Figures 11 and 12 show, time spent on worksite enforcement, both in
terms of number of workyears and as a percentage of total investigations workyears,
decreased until FY1994 and then began increasing.  The mid-1990s increase
coincided with actions by the Clinton Administration and Congress to bolster
worksite enforcement.
After FY1997, as Figures 11 and 12 show, time spent on employer cases
trended downward.  In FY2003, worksite enforcement accounted for 3.5% of the
total investigation workyears, less than one-fifth of its share in FY1992.  The start of
this decline coincided with a change in INS’s approach to worksite enforcement, set
forth in a May 1998 memorandum by INS Executive Associate Commissioner for
Field Operations Michael Pearson.226  Apparently, the change was prompted largely
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1998), pp. 987-996.
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 Robert Warren, of the former INS, estimated that the unauthorized population was 3.4
million in 1992, and  Jeffery Passel, currently of the Pew Hispanic Center, estimated that
the unauthorized population was 9.3 million in 2002 and 10.3 million in 2004.  For a full
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by complaints about INS tactics during worksite raids.  According to Pearson, the
new procedures described in the memorandum and the accompanying materials
responded to complaints by Congress and others, and incorporated the “best
practices” of various offices.227
Fraud.  As Figures 11 and 12 illustrate, fraud investigations have declined
from FY1992 through FY2003, both as percent of interior enforcement and in terms
of actual workyears. Although there appears to be an upturn, most likely due to the
1999 Interior Enforcement Strategy mentioned previously, the overall trends have
been downward.  As a percent of interior enforcement workyears, fraud
investigations dropped from 15.3% in FY1992 to 7.7% in FY2003. Actual workyears
fell from 210 to 146 over the same period.
Smuggling.  For the years analyzed, the peak workyears and the largest
percentage of all interior enforcement hours devoted to alien smuggling correspond
to the first three years of the INS interior enforcement strategy (FY1999 through
FY2001) when  alien smuggling was the agency’s second highest priority.  (The
removal of criminal aliens was the first priority.) After FY2001, the number of
workyears as well as the percentage of all hours devoted to alien smuggling declined,
possibly as a result of shifting priorities after the terrorist attacks in September 2001.
The number of hours devoted to smuggling cases was the lowest in FY1995 (211
workyears), and largest in FY1999 and FY2000 (348 workyears). The proportion of
all interior enforcement hours devoted to alien smuggling was smallest in FY1997
(14.5%), and largest in FY2001 (18.6%).  In FY2003, 279 workyears were devoted
to smuggling cases which corresponded to 14.7% of all interior enforcement
workyears.  Nonetheless, according to ICE the resources and time devoted to alien
smuggling are larger if other relevant investigative programs (such as criminal aliens,
identity and benefit fraud, and the Joint Terrorism Task Force) are included in the
total.228  (See Figures 11 and 12.)
Status Violators.  Status violators are aliens who have entered without
inspection or have overstayed their visas (i.e., the alien is out of status). As shown
in Figure 11, the number of hours spent on status violators almost tripled between
FY1992 and FY2000, from 46 workyears to 124 workyears.  The percentage of
overall investigative time spent on status violation investigations doubled during that
time period, as did the resident unauthorized alien population in the United States.229
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 CRS analysis of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) PAS data.
During the years examined, the former INS tracked the hours immigration inspectors spent
on several activities, including enforcing immigration law.  CRS also included hours spent
on processing expedited removal cases and escorting aliens (detention duty) as enforcement
hours.      
(See Figure 12.)   In FY1992, 3.3% of all hours were devoted to status violations
compared to 6.7% of all hours in FY2003. The number of hours spent on status
violators, as well as the percent of time devoted to status violators, declined between
FY2000 and FY2001, then increased between FY2001 and FY2003.  Nonetheless,
it is interesting to note, that in the most recent data year, only 6.7% of investigative
hours were spend on status violators when the unauthorized population was estimated
to be almost 10 million.
Administrative and Other.  The amount of hours spent on administrative
and non-investigative tasks more than doubled between FY1992 and FY1998, from
205 workyears to 477 workyears, as illustrated in Figure 11. Similarly, as shown in
Figure 12, the percent of hours devoted to administrative tasks increased from 14.9%
to 23.2%, the largest proportion devoted to administrative duties for any year.  It is
interesting to note that in 1999, INS released its interior enforcement strategy which
may account for the increase in non-investigative hours.   In addition, the increase in
administrative and other hours may be the result of an increase in time devoted to
developing databases, including the development of an entry/exit system which was
mandated in IIRIRA in 1996.
In FY2003, 23% of all hours (435 workyears) were devoted to administrative
and non-investigative tasks.  In addition, the percent of time devoted to
miscellaneous tasks remained under 1% until FY2002 and FY2003, and then
increased in both years. (See Figure 12.) This increase may be attributable to the
productivity time lost/needed when DHS was being formed.
Border Enforcement
Inspectors.  As Figure 9 and Table 2 above shows, the number of hours spent
on inspection duties increased between FY1992 (2,273 workyears) and FY1994
(2,446 workyears), decreased in FY1995 (2,245 workyears), and then steadily
increased until FY2000 (3,189 workyears).  The total number of hours decreased
between FY2000 and FY2001, increased between FY2001 and FY2002, and then
decreased to the lowest level of the period in FY2003 (2,098 workyears).
The largest percentage of hours for inspectors is spent in primary inspections,
and this proportion has been fairly constant through the years analyzed, ranging from
62.2% (FY1998) to 69.8% (FY2001). In FY2003, immigration inspectors spent 13%
of their time on enforcement-related activities.230 Over the previous 11 years, the time
spent by immigration inspectors on enforcement activities has steadily risen, with the
exceptions of FY1996 when the percentage dropped by one percent from FY1995,
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and FY2001 when the percentage dropped by three percent from FY2000.  (See
Figure 9 and Table 2.)
USBP.  The number of hours worked by the USBP, mostly spent patrolling the
border between points of entry, almost doubled between FY1997 and FY2002, from
3,073 workyears to 6,096 workyears (See Figure 14).  The number of USBP
workyears decreased slightly, by three workyears between FY2002 and FY2003.  The
workyears for USBP increased dramatically between FY2003 and FY2005.  In
FY2004, USBP spent 6,591 workyears on enforcement efforts, and in FY2005, 8,018
workyears.
Source:  CRS analysis of data from the Performance Analysis System (PAS).
Interestingly, as illustrated in Figure 15, an increase in workyears does not
automatically result in an increase in apprehensions.  Between FY1997 and FY2000,
both workyears and apprehensions increased. In FY2001 and FY2002, although
USBP workyears continued to increase, the number of apprehensions decreased.
Between FY2003 and FY2004, the workyears increased eight percent from 6,093 to
6,591, while apprehensions increased 25% from 931,557 to 1.2 million.
Comparatively, between FY2004 and FY2005, the number of USBP workyears
increased 22% from 6,591 to 8,018, while the number of apprehensions increased
only 3%.  The decrease in apprehensions since FY2000 may be attributable to fewer
unauthorized aliens trying to enter the country due to the economic recession, and the
increased difficulty finding employment. USBP argues that the reason why
apprehensions do not seem to be increasing at the same rate as resources is because
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Figure 14.  USBP, Inspectors, and Interior Enforcement Workyears:
FY1997-FY2003
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the “Prevention through Deterrence” strategy is finally reaching a critical mass of
enough agents and resources placed directly on the border to severely inhibit illegal
migrants from entering the country.231  It may be that additional agents do not have
a large effect on apprehensions, or that the additional number of agents is not large
enough to actually increase apprehensions.
Source:  CRS analysis of unpublished DHS data; CRS presentation of data from the following
sources: for 1997, Immigration and Naturalization Service, FY1997 Statistical Yearbook of the INS.
For FY1998-FY2004, DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, FY2004 Yearbook of Immigration
Statistics, January 2006.  FY2005, DHS, FY2005 Monthly Statistical Report, Year End, September
2005.
Comparison
Figure 14 illustrates that many more resources (measured in staff hours) have
been allotted to enforcement between the ports of entry than enforcement within the
United States and at the ports of entry.  While the amount of USBP resources
significantly increased between FY1997 and FY2003, the resources for both
inspections and interior enforcement increased more modestly between FY1997 and
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FY1999, while inspection hours also increased between FY1999 and FY2000.  Hours
for interior enforcement, saw a mix of increases and decreased during that period.
Between FY2000 and FY2002 interior enforcement hours decreased, and then
increased between FY2002 and FY2003.  Nonetheless, for the years analyzed,
workyears spent on interior enforcement were highest in FY1999, the first year of the
INS’ interior enforcement strategy. Inspection hours decreased between FY2000 and
FY2001, increased in FY2002, and then decreased again in FY2003.  The amount of
time inspectors spend on enforcement activities, increased between FY1997 and
FY2000, decreased substantially in FY2001, and then increased substantially in
FY2002.  Between FY2002 and FY2003, the number of inspector enforcement hours
decreased.
Comparing FY1997 with FY2003, the USBP hours almost doubled from 3,073
to 6,093 workyears, while the interior enforcement hours increased slightly from
1,832 to 1,892 workyears, and the number of inspection hours fell from 2,665 to
2,098.  Nonetheless, a comparison of FY1997 and FY2003, shows that amount of
time inspectors spent on enforcement activities almost doubled, from 141 workyears
to 271 workyears.  Importantly, inspection hours are dependent on workload, (i.e.,
how many people are entering the country in any one year), but since the number of
aliens illegally present in the country continues to grow, it is difficult to argue that
there has been a decrease in the interior or border enforcement workload.
DHS Organizational Structure
Questions have been raised concerning the impact of DHS’s organizational
structure on the effective enforcement of immigration laws.232  Nonetheless, any
attempt to determine the consequence of DHS’s structure on immigration
enforcement, involves disentangling (1) issues that remain from the former INS (i.e.,
are the problems encountered by ICE and CBP the same as those found in the former
INS); (2) issues related to the time needed for a newly created department to function
smoothly; and (3) issues related to the separation of immigration enforcement
functions into separate agencies — especially the distinction between CBP and ICE.
Although this section focuses on some of the issues facing the new department, it is
important to note that there are benefits to combining the disparate agencies in the
new department.. For example, ICE can pursue money laundering charges related to
smuggling and document fraud through the Financial Investigations Division.  This
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capacity did not exist in INS, and INS would have had to seek outside assistance to
pursue additional charges.233
Inherited INS Issues
Over the years, GAO completed several reports on the management in the
former INS which noted that INS faced significant challenges in assembling the basic
systems and processes that organizations need to complete their goal.234  GAO found
a lack of
! clearly delineated roles and responsibilities leading to overlapping
responsibilities and ineffective use of resources (e.g., lacking the
ability to determine staffing needs);
! policies and procedures to balance competing priorities such as
working level guidance;235
! effective internal and external communication and coordination (i.e,
a lack of clarity on responsibilities and authorities); and
!  automated systems to provide accurate and timely information to
support its operations.
In testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Immigration,
Border Security, and Claims in April 2003,  GAO noted that “unless these elements
were established, enforcing immigration laws..., and effectively participating in the
government wide efforts to combat terrorism would be problematic regardless of
how the immigration function was organized.”236
INS faced numerous challenges implementing its interior enforcement
strategy.237  Historically, Congress and INS devoted five times more resources (staff
and funding) to border enforcement than to interior enforcement.238 The INS claimed
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that it lacked sufficient staff to reach its interior enforcement goals, but the agency
never performed a systematic assessment of their staffing needs to reach program
goals and the best allocation of existing staff resources.239  GAO testified in 2003 that
the challenges in the Interior Enforcement program would require high-level attention
and a concerted effort from ICE. For example, there were hundreds of thousands of
criminal aliens, the number of aliens smuggled into the United States had grown
along with the complexity of the alien smuggling operations, tens of thousands of
aliens illegally seek to gain immigration benefit, and millions of unauthorized aliens
use fraudulent documents to gain employment.240
In a 2004 report, GAO found that DHS management issues were similar to those
in the former INS.  For example, as in the former INS, DHS lacks clarity and formal
guidelines for addressing overlapping roles and responsibilities of ICE and CBP,
which has lead to disagreements, confusion, and institutional barriers between the
two agencies.241
Database Integration.  INS had a longstanding history of using antiquated
databases and in some cases had paper-based systems.  Several GAO reports and one
by the DOJ Inspector General noted the outdated systems and databases that
immigration officials used to conduct their daily business.242  Prompted by the 2001
terrorist attacks, in 2002 Congress passed the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act of 2002.243  The act mandated the integration of immigration data
systems and databases.  The act also called for the integration of data systems and
databases that contain federal law enforcement and intelligence information relevant
to making decisions on visa admissibility and the removal of aliens.
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Many assert that the need for all agencies involved in admitting aliens to share
intelligence and coordinate activities is essential for U.S. immigration policy to be
effective in securing the homeland.  Some maintain that the reforms Congress made
in the mid-1990s requiring all visa applicants to be checked against lookout databases
were inadequate because the databases across the relevant agencies were not
interoperable and the various agencies were territorial with their data.  They maintain
that, in the long run, the most efficient and effective guard against the entry of aliens
who would do us harm is an interagency and inter-departmental database that is
accessible in “real time” to consular officers, CBP inspectors, and key law
enforcement and intelligence officials.
Others point to the cost, time, and complexity of developing interoperable
databases.  They cite the difficulty thus far in determining what biometric identifiers
are most appropriate for screening aliens.244  They point out competing technologies
of the existing databases in which various key agencies have already heavily
invested.  Some maintain that success of the interoperable database technology
depends on 100% inclusion of aliens applying for visas and seeking admission, but
that the sheer scope of such a system poses “real time” implementation issues.  They
also warn that if intelligence data becomes too accessible across agencies, national
security may actually be breached because sensitive information may be more likely
to fall into the wrong hands. Privacy concerns arise as well as the data sharing and
interoperability broadens.
Separation of Immigration Functions into Separate DHS
Agencies 
When ICE and CBP were created, neither agency was given responsibility for
all immigration enforcement activities, and neither was designated the lead agency
in immigration enforcement.  ICE received INS’ investigations and intelligence
functions, as well as its detention and removal.  CBP received the inspections
functions and the border patrol.  CBP and ICE need to heavily rely on each other
because within the new structure, enforcement efforts initiated by CBP often are
supposed to be completed by ICE.  In addition, CBP border patrol agents are
dependent on ICE’s DRO for the detention and removal of some of the aliens that
they apprehend.245  Nonetheless, there have been reports of rivalries between ICE and
CBP, which inhibit coordination.  Moreover, the creation of the DHS has meant that
in order to implement an interior enforcement strategy, ICE has to coordinate with
CBP and Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).246  As discussed
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above, when the Department of Homeland Security was formed, USCIS was tasked
with the adjudication (service) functions of the former INS.
INS and U.S. Customs Service investigators and intelligence analysts were
merged into ICE’s investigations and intelligence offices, and INS’ detention and
removal program was placed in ICE’s detention and removal office (DRO).
Traditionally, INS investigators specialized in immigration enforcement (e.g.,
locating criminal aliens, alien smuggling) while Customs investigators specialized
in customs enforcement (e.g., drug smuggling, money laundering).  In addition, INS
investigators primarily investigated civil violations of immigration law, while
customs investigators investigated criminal violations related to Customs law.  INS
and Customs investigators brought their own cultures, policies, mission priorities,
procedures to the newly created ICE, which is the second largest investigative bureau
in the federal government with approximately 20,000 employees.247  Conversely,
CBP blended entities with similar missions.
Although much of the Congressional attention has focused on the division of
ICE and CBP, some issues have also been raised concerning the interaction between
USCIS and ICE. INS’ approach to benefit fraud was fragmented and unfocused.  INS
also failed to establish guidance to assure that high-priority cases were
investigated.248  With the creation of DHS, investigating benefit fraud became the
responsibility of ICE.  Nonetheless, ICE reportedly did not do this, and USCIS
established its own benefits fraud investigations unit.  According to ICE, it only
handles cases of large and expansive benefit fraud which are referred to them from
USCIS.  All other cases of benefit fraud are handled by USCIS.249
OIG Merger Report.  DHS’ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) examined
the merits of merging CBP and ICE, in a report based largely on testimonial
evidence.  The OIG analyzed whether the difficulties encountered were due to the
implementation of the new department or to  inherited pre-existing conditions from
the former INS.  The report also considered other factors such as funding problems
and accounting system difficulties.  The OIG concluded that organizational structure
at the time250 contributed to the problems in three major areas: (1) coordination
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between apprehensions and detention and removal efforts, (2) coordination between
interdiction and investigative efforts, and (3) coordination of intelligence activities.251
The report found that the role of integrating ICE and CBP activities had been
the responsibility of Directorate of Border of Transportation Security (BTS) which
oversaw both ICE and CBP, but due to staffing shortfalls and a lack of authority
(including budget authority) over the bureaus, BTS failed to: (1) prevent ICE and
CBP from working at cross purposes; (2) synchronize CBP and ICE operations; and
(3) resolve conflicts between the two agencies.  The report concluded that CBP and
ICE had failed to coordinate efforts, and that each organization engaged in discrete
planning and strategy development processes (leading to different priorities), and
field staff were accountable to separate chains of command.  In addition, the report
indicated that the division between ICE and CBP is marked by a clear institutional
barrier, and the shortfalls in operational coordination and information sharing have
fostered negative relations between CBP and ICE personnel, including competition
and mistrust.252
Many have said that a merger the magnitude of DHS would take five years or
more to settle into satisfactory operations; however, the OIG concluded that the
integration has not progressed as well as expected, noting that the people they
interviewed almost universally stated that the current problems were seen as
unresolvable because of the “unnatural separation” of interdependent functions.253
Nonetheless, DHS responded to the OIG’s recommendation to merge ICE and CBP
by maintaining another reorganization would entail costs, including loss of employee
productivity during the transition. In addition, DHS noted  that the new organization
could be too big and unwieldy, with an overly large span of control. Moreover, the
report indicated that other agencies may fear that a combined border security agency
would become the dominant law enforcement entity.254
Furthermore, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, undertook
a review of the department (called the Second Stage Review) and after careful study
concluded that the best course was not to merge ICE and CBP, but to institute a new
management structure to reduce bureaucracy, improve accountability, and enhance
coordination.   Secretary Chertoff also concluded that a merger would diminish the
roles of the Assistant Secretary of ICE and the Commissioner of CBP, creating a new
bureaucratic reporting mechanism which would diminish coordination rather than
enhance it.   Secretary Chertoff recommended innovation rather than another massive
reorganization.255
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Investigations.  The OIG concluded that the current organizational structure
has also hampered coordination of interdiction and investigative efforts. Since the
investigative functions have been separated into ICE, CBP officers have reported that
ICE no longer accepts as many case referrals from CBP inspectors and border patrol
agents.  ICE reported that investigative coordination is declining because CBP
increasingly refers cases to other agencies such as the FBI and DEA without notifying
ICE.  In addition, ICE has reported that investigations have been compromised due
to CBP’s “inexperienced” investigative work.256  Reportedly, CBP is now developing
its own investigative capabilities.  Nonetheless, CBP and ICE managers have asserted
that the policy is to refer all cases to ICE for investigation.257
Intelligence.  With the formation of DHS, all immigration intelligence agents
including those from the border patrol were placed in ICE’s intelligence program,
which is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating immigration related
intelligence used by ICE, CBP and USCIS.258  However, CBP recently established its
own intelligence  program.  CBP and ICE intelligence requirements overlap to a large
extent, but the two bureaus have separate intelligence structures and products.  The
OIG reported that the intelligence coordination needs to improve, and that the only
significant  coordination between ICE and CBP relates to intelligence received from
other agencies.259
The organization’s primary means of sharing intelligence is through the
Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) which was not designed for
this purpose as it does not highlight trends or detect anomalies.  In addition, most
CBP personnel lack the required clearance to retrieve critical information entered into
TECS by ICE. The OIG concluded that the reliance on the system is inhibiting the
timely and effective exchange of information.260
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Conclusion
Many duties are incorporated under the banner of immigration enforcement.
These include removing aliens who should not be in the United States, investigating
alien smuggling and trafficking, patrolling between and at ports of entry, combating
document and benefit fraud, and enforcing the prohibitions against employers hiring
aliens without work authorization.  Due to the breadth of immigration enforcement
activities, the allocation of resources appears to be significant in determining the
ability to enforce the immigration laws.  Nonetheless, some contend a policy based
solely on enforcement is bound to fail, and only a legalization program, providing a
clean slate, can reduce the unauthorized population.261  However, others assert that
the United States has not tried immigration enforcement, arguing that most of the
resources have been devoted to border enforcement, and that the United States has
not fully engaged in other types of immigration enforcement, most notably worksite
enforcement.262
The majority of aliens come to the United States for economic opportunities and
for family reunification.  The ability to contain illegal migration caused by those
seeking family reunification may also depend on the ability of DHS to clear the
backlog of immigration petitions, and process new petitions.  In addition, the per-
country ceilings on certain types of family based immigration affect the ability of
aliens from countries with high levels of immigration (e.g., the Philippines) to
immigrate.263  Congressional action would be needed to change the per-country
ceilings.264  Some maintain that only reform of the legal immigration system can
decrease illegal immigration.265
In addition, the amount of illegal migration may also be dependent on the
economic health of the sending countries, especially of those countries in the
Americas. Factors in other countries effect the desire of their populations to
immigrate, legally or illegally, to the United States.  For example, between 2000 and
2003, Uruguay experienced a recession increasing the propensity of its citizens to
live and work illegally in the United States.266 Thus, some argue that only a guest
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worker program, creating opportunities for a large number of immigrants to come to
the United States to work, could significantly reduce the unauthorized migration.267
However, others argue that better worksite enforcement and enforcement document
fraud would make it more difficult for unauthorized aliens to find work, resulting in
a decrease in the unauthorized population.268  It is possible that a combination of a
guest worker program and increased worksite enforcement may be utilized to reduce
the unauthorized population.
Although within the United States, the enforcement of immigration law is
primarily the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security’s Bureaus of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), one possible option to aid in the reduction of the unauthorized alien
population might be to increase the coordination and information sharing with other
federal agencies, such as the Social Security Administration and the Department of
Labor.  Another approach may be to increase the role of local law enforcement
agencies in the enforcement of immigration laws.269  Yet many fear that these options
will distract the agencies from their primary missions and could hinder the agencies
ability to perform other functions if unauthorized aliens will not interact with them.
In some instances, the enforcement of certain immigration laws can be
controversial.  Although few would argue that aliens should be allowed to enter
without being inspected by an immigration officer, and that smugglers and traffickers
should not be punished, enforcement against longer-term, noncriminal, unauthorized
aliens is often politically difficult due to these aliens’ long standing ties to their
communities.  Often these aliens are integrated in their communities, and the
government’s attempts to remove them can result in a backlash from the community.
Furthermore, there are concerns that increased enforcement against aliens working
illegally will disrupt sectors of the economy that depend on foreign labor, and harm
the United States economy.  The conflicting pressures to reduce the unauthorized
population while safeguarding the U.S. economy and maintaining good will among
the populace, as well as resource constraints and management issues in DHS,
combine to make immigration enforcement policy a complex issue.
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Appendix A:  List of Acronyms
BIA Board of Immigration Appeals (in the Executive Office for Immigration Review)
CBP Bureau of Customs and Border Protections (in the Department of Homeland Security)
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOJ Department of Justice
DOS Department of State
DRO Office of Detention and Removal (in the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement)
EOIR Executive Office for Immigration Review (in the Department of Justice)
ESA Employment Standards Administration (in the Department of Labor)
ICE Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (in the Department of Homeland
Security)
IJ Immigration Judge (works in Executive Office for Immigration Review)
INA Immigration and Nationality Act (Title 8 of the United States Code)
OI Office of Investigations (in the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement)
OR Own Recognizance
NIT Notice of Intent to Fine
NTA Notice to Appear
POE Port of entry
SSA The Social Security Administration
SSN Social Security Number
USBP United States Border Patrol (in the Bureau of Customs and Border Protections)
USCIS Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (in the Department of Homeland
Security)
